Dreptul Privat European – 15 ani si 16 solutii

Ewoud H. Hondius, Fifteen Years of European Private Law – at the Occasion of the 15th Birthday of the Trento/Torino Common Core of European Private Law Project (September, 22 2009). Opinio Juris in Comparatione Vol. 2/2009, Paper No. 5. Available at SSRN. Republicat in Revista Romana de Drept European, nr. 6/2009

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Papa Benedict al XVI-lea despre etica si capitalism. Care dintre ele a esuat?

Ultima reuniune G8 coincide cu noua enciclica papala, CARITAS IN VERITATE.

Sau, cum ar veni, episcopul Romei despre globalizare si subsidiaritate. Un fragment extras din pct. 57 al documentului, in limba engleza:

„Subsidiarity is first and foremost a form of assistance to the human person via the autonomy of intermediate bodies. Such assistance is offered when individuals or groups are unable to accomplish something on their own, and it is always designed to achieve their emancipation, because it fosters freedom and participation through assumption of responsibility. Subsidiarity respects personal dignity by recognizing in the person a subject who is always capable of giving something to others. By considering reciprocity as the heart of what it is to be a human being, subsidiarity is the most effective antidote against any form of all-encompassing welfare state. It is able to take account both of the manifold articulation of plans — and therefore of the plurality of subjects — as well as the coordination of those plans. Hence the principle of subsidiarity is particularly well-suited to managing globalization and directing it towards authentic human development. In order not to produce a dangerous universal power of a tyrannical nature, the governance of globalization must be marked by subsidiarity, articulated into several layers and involving different levels that can work together. Globalization certainly requires authority, insofar as it poses the problem of a global common good that needs to be pursued. This authority, however, must be organized in a subsidiary and stratified way[138], if it is not to infringe upon freedom and if it is to yield effective results in practice”.

Textul in FR suna mai exact. Din pacate, varianta in limba latina n-a aparut inca.


The Wall Street Journal

Reprezentarea partilor in fata instantelor comunitare. Opinie (avizata&studiata)

CHRISTOPHER MORCOM, Representation of Parties before the European Court of Justice—Is There a Need for Reform?, European Intellectual Property Review, Volume 31, Issue 5, 2009


Orders under the Courts and Legal Services Act 1990 have designated the Chartered Institute of Patent Agents (CIPA) and the Institute of Trade Mark Attorneys (ITMA) as \”authorised bodies\” for the grant of rights of audience and litigators\’ rights. Duly qualified patent and trade mark attorneys are now placed on the same footing as solicitors. Not so in the European Court of Justice (ECJ), the statutes of which restrict these rights to \”lawyers\”. Recent Court of First Instance (CFI) decisions have prevented patent and trade mark attorneys from appearing or instructing barristers in cases before the court. This opinion considers the decisions and questions the Court\’s interpretation of the word \”lawyer\”, which appears to ignore the fact that the attorneys have been granted rights under the 1990 Act to act, in essence, as lawyers.

Franta. Decret privind conditiile de remunerare a „cadrelor de conducere” din intreprinderi

Suna frumos, n’asha?, „cadre de conducere”. E vorba despre intreprinderi ce primesc ajutoare de stat sau care beneficiaza de sustinerea statului.

Decretul a fost adoptat „datorita faptului” (sic!) crizei economice actuale.


Décret n° 2009-348 du 30 mars 2009 relatif aux conditions de rémunération des dirigeants des entreprises aidées par l’Etat ou bénéficiant du soutien de l’Etat du fait de la crise économique et des responsables des entreprises publiques


Dorintele ascunse ale Comisiei: recomandari cu caracter de directiva (societatile comerciale)

Alessandra Zanardo {*}, Does the Application by Member States of the Commission Recommendations on Corporate Governance Issues Depend on the Diversity of Ownership Structures and Corporate Governance Systems?, December 24, 2008. Bocconi Legal Studies Research Paper No. 1320195. Available at SSRN.

In December 2004 and February 2005, the EC Commission adopted two Recommendations in order to foster an appropriate regime for the remuneration of directors of listed companies and to strengthen the role of non-executive or supervisory directors and of the committees of the (supervisory) board, respectively. In July 2007 the Commission published two Reports on the application by the Member States of both Recommendations. The objective of these Reports – which covered 21 Member States – was to evaluate whether the Member States had put in place the necessary framework in order to give effect to the main principles of the Recommendations and to analyse, in detail, the principles actually implemented by each country. The findings of the Commission’s evaluation reveal significant differences in the approach to these issues, in the level of application of the single provisions and, to some extent, in the means used to comply with the Recommendations. In this paper, I first analyse whether the level and the modalities of the implementation by the Member States actually depend on the diversity of share ownership structures, corporate governance systems and legal environment in European Union and, where relevant, to what extent. Second, I examine the need and appropriateness of using Recommendations (‘soft law’) instead of Directives (‘hard law’) to promote the process of convergence of corporate governance rules and practices across the EU.

Colocviu CSDE: Taxa auto din perspectiva dreptului comunitar, 20 martie 2009

Art. 281 din OUG 34 – plangerea se adreseaza si instantei de judecata

Art. 281alin. (1) din OUG 34/2006: „Plângerea se înaintează Consiliului, sub sancţiunea nulităţii acesteia, care va transmite dosarul instanţei competente în cel mult 3 zile de la expirarea termenului pentru exercitarea căii de atac.”

DCC. nr. 569/2008, M. Of. nr. 537/16 iul. 2008
– se suspendă pentru o perioadă de 45 de zile prevederile art. 281 alin. (1)

Admite exceptia in masura in care nu permite ca plangerea sa fie adresata si direct instantei de judecata competente.
(termenul se împlineşte la data de 30 aug. 2008, după care operează prevederile art. 147 alin. (1) din Constituţie)

DCC. nr. 732/2008 – art. 266 – 281, art. 283 – 285 M. Of. nr. 592/7 aug. 2008 – respins

Decizie nr. 1021 din 07 octombrie 2008 referitoare la respingerea excepţiei de neconstituţionalitate a dispoziţiilor art. 281 alin. (1) din Ordonanţa de urgenţă a Guvernului nr. 34/2006 privind atribuirea contractelor de achiziţie publică, a contractelor de concesiune de lucrări publice şi a contractelor de concesiune de servicii, monitorul Oficial nr. 748 din 5 noiembrie 2008.

Respinge ca inadmisibila intrucat se publicase Decizia nr. 569/2008.

Cumparati colorat, dar ecologic. Pe banii statului, adica ai nostri..

Parearea mea, ca nu sunt nici economist, nici specialist este ca aceste cumparaturi – achizitii publice – de culoare verde sunt mai scumpe si sunt in avantajul unora.

Ba chiar, incalca actualele reglementari referitoare la concurenta deschisa, ca nu toata lumea are acces la tehnologia green.


John Armour, David A. Skeel: The Divergence of U.S. and UK Takeover Regulation

John Armour, David A. Skeel, The Divergence of U.S. and UK Takeover Regulation, Regulation, Vol. 30, No. 3, Fall 2007
Available at SSRN.

Hostile takeovers are commonly thought to play a key role in rendering managers accountable to dispersed shareholders. Yet, surprisingly little attention has been paid to the very significant differences in takeover regulation between the two most prominent practitioners of hostile takeover, the United Kingdom and the United States. In the UK, defensive tactics by target managers are prohibited, whereas in the United States, Delaware law gives managers a good deal of room to maneuver. We examine the evolution of the two regimes from a public choice perspective, and argue that the differences between the two countries is influenced by differences in the mode of regulation – that is, by who it is that does the regulating.

Corporate Governance and the Importance of Macroeconomic Context

Alan Dignam and Michael Galanis, Corporate Governance and the Importance of Macroeconomic Context, Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 2008 28(2):201-243. [*]

This article seeks to bring a focus to the significance of trade and finance in corporate governance outcomes. It explores the theoretical and historical link between micro-economic-level firm structure and macro-economic institutions such as trade and finance. The more open the economy, it argues, the more difficult it is in the long run to sustain an insider model. It then argues that changes in interdependent aspects of macro-economic policy in the UK and the US-primarily trade liberalization and the end of capital controls-combined with the presence of developed capital markets and a self-regulatory ethos, allowed institutional investors to refocus the market-level rules on shareholders despite the managerial bias of their legal systems, and enabled the emergence of the outsider shareholder-oriented systems present there today. The article then argues that core insider systems such as those in Germany and France operated with different financing arrangements which meant that they were less susceptible to immediate change. However, in the long run global economic conditions have continued to push shareholder-oriented norms on insider systems. The article concludes that if these conditions persist, then governments will lose, or may indeed already have lost, sovereignty with regard to choice of corporate governance system.