Brian Bix, Kelsen and Normativity Revisited (June 28, 2013). Carlos Bernal & Marcelo Porciuncula (eds.), Festschrift for Stanley L. Paulson (Marcial Pons, Forthcoming); Minnesota Legal Studies Research Paper 13-27. Available at SSRN
Central to Hans Kelsen’s work (and the work of many other legal theorists of the past century ) is the idea that law is a normative system, and that any theory about the nature of law must focus on its normativity. There are familiar questions connected with explaining legal normativity: e.g., What is the connection between legal normativity and other normative systems, in particular, morality? And there are methodological questions: when theorists claim that we need to (and that they will) “explain the normativity of law,” what is it that is being explained? This paper focuses on issues relating to legal normativity, emphasizing the way these matters have been elaborated in the works of Kelsen and H. L. A. Hart and later commentators on their theories.
In Part I, I offer a view regarding the nature of law and legal normativity that I believe could reasonably be read off of some of Kelsen’s work. The argument is that the Basic Norm is presupposed when a citizen chooses to read the actions of legal officials in a normative way. In this Kelsenian system, all normative systems are structurally and logically similar, but each normative system is independent of every other system – thus, law is, in this sense, conceptually separate from morality.
Part II turns to Hart’s theory, analyzing the extent to which his approach views legal normativity as sui generis. This approach will raise questions regarding what has become a consensus view in contemporary jurisprudence: that law makes moral claims. I show how, instead, a more deflationary (and less morally-flavored) understanding of the nature of law is tenable, and may in fact work better than current conventional (morally-focused) understandings.
Tecla Mazzarese, FORME DI RAZIONALITÀ DELLE DECISIONI GIUDIZIALI, 2012 – pp. 223 – € 12,00 – ISBN 978-88-348-2921-9, G. Giappichelli editore [editia 1996]
Prefazione. – 0. Introduzione. – 1. Termini per una critica del sillogismo giudiziale. – 2. Costitutività vs. dichiaratività delle decisioni giudiziali. – 3. Scoperta e giustificazione nelle decisioni giudiziali. – 4. Logica fuzzy e presunto irrazionalismo normativo. – 5. Fuzziness e decisioni giudiziali. – 6. Decisioni giudiziali e ragionamento approssimato. – Riferimenti bibliografici.
Sylvain Brouard, Olivier Costa, Thomas König (Eds.), The Europeanization of Domestic Legislatures. The Empirical Implications of the Delors’ Myth in Nine Countries, Springer, 2012, VIII, 244 p. 41 illus., 30 in color.
Table of contents [pdf.]
– Addresses several strong theses, including those of G. Majone, A. Moravcsik, and Martin and Vanberg, about Europeanization and legislation
– Includes an annex with extensive quantitative data on law Europeanization, detailed by country, type of norm, topic, period of time, etc
– Provides a method by which to measure Europeanization
In ten years 80 per cent of the legislation related to economics, maybe also to taxes and social aff airs, will be of Community origin.” This declaration has been largely quoted, paraphrased and deformed by different authors, creating a persistent myth according to which 80% of the legislative activity of the national legislatures would soon be reduced to the simple transposition of European norms”. This book addresses the topic of the scope and impact of Europeanization on national legislation, as a part of the Europeanization debate which raises normative concerns linked to the “democratic deficit” debate. The state of the art shows that there are many assumptions and claims on how European integration may affect national legislation and, more generally, domestic governance but that there is a lack of solid and comparative data to test them. The aim of the book is to give a solid and comparative insight into Europeanization focusing on effective outcomes in a systematic way. This book analyzes the period 1986-2008 and includes an introduction, a global overview of European legislative activities which set the background for Europeanization of national legislatures, 9 country contributions (8 EU member states + Switzerland) including systematic, comparative and standardized data, tables and figures, and a conclusion with a comparative analysis of the European and domestic reasons for Europeanization.
All national contributions conclude that Europeanization of national legislation is much more limited than assumed in the literature and public debate. It is limited to 10 to 30% of laws (depending on the country), far less than the 80% predicted by Jacques Delors and mentioned daily by medias and public opinion leaders to demonstrate EU domination on member states. Beside that general statement, the various chapters propose a deep insight on EU constraint over national legislation, providing much information on the kind of laws and policies that are Europeanized, the evolution of this process through time, the impact of Europeanization on the balance of powers and the relations between majority and opposition at national level, the strategies developed by national institutions in that context, and many other issues, making the book of inter
Yasuhiro Shigeta, The ECJ’s ‘Hard’ Control over Compliance with International Environmental Law: Its Procedural and Substantive Aspects, International Community Law Review, Volume 11, Number 3, September 2009, pp. 251-305.
This study shows that the ECJ, while not directly applying and interpreting environmental treaties, exercises procedurally and substantively ‘hard’ control over compliance with EC legislation implementing those treaties, in the fields of nature conservation and hazardous waste management, on certain conditions and within certain limits. This study also shows that the ECJ’s acknowledgment of its exclusive jurisdiction on the marine environment as seen in the 2006 MOX Plant case has contradictory effect on its substantively ‘hard’ control: such acknowledgment, although being a plus factor where there is no Community measure, becomes a minus factor since it in practice means that there already exist Community measures. Although the above observations are also instructive to other international judiciaries’ study, structural and situational differences should be considered.
Sau cum ar veni „the use of foreign law & doctrine in American courts”…Ori despre modele de „fédéralisme d’exécution„.
„The federal systems of Switzerland, Germany, and the European Union, for example, all provide that constituent states, not federal bureaucracies, will themselves implement many of the laws, rules, regulations, or decrees enacted by the central „federal” body.”
Supreme Court of United States, 521 U.S. 898, Printz v. United States, 95-1478 Argued: December 3, 1996 – Decided: June 27, 1997. Justice Breyer, with whom Justice Stevens joins, dissenting.
In a well-known series of recent cases, the Supreme Court of the United States has dramatically narrowed the obligation of states to comply with the rules of accountability that Congress has applied to other aspects of our national commercial life. Although the Court has frequently invoked the Eleventh Amendment to defend its narrowing of state accountability, its decision in Alden v. Maine makes clear that state sovereign immunity rests less on the text of the Constitution than on unwritten structural postulates that it has described as „implicit in the constitutional design.” Across the Atlantic, the European Court of Justice has drawn on similarly unwritten postulates in developing rules to govern member state accountability to central legislative norms. Yet in Europe, the ECJ has pushed in the opposite direction, expanding member state liability beyond the limits specified in the treaties that constitute the European Union.
This paper takes the differing approaches of the Supreme Court and the ECJ as the jumping off point for a rumination on the legitimacy of constitutional change in federal systems. In Europe, a doctrine known as the acquis communautaire has evolved in ways that require newly admitted member states to subscribe not only to the formal terms of the treaties themselves but also to the unwritten rules that the ECJ has announced in working out a jurisprudence of European integration. Avowedly forward looking, the acquis provides an underpinning of legitimacy for the ECJ’s jurisprudence. In effect, the acquis suggests that each member state, upon accession to the Union, must accept both the specific terms of prior judicial decisions and the notion of an evolving jurisprudence. In the United States, by contrast, the Supreme Court’s decisions have looked backwards through the lens of originalism to identify the nature of the accessionary bargain of the original thirteen states. Such a backward-looking originalism corresponds to the emphasis in the American equal-footing doctrine on the nature of the original deal among the states that formed the Union. It also corresponds to the Court’s rejection of the metaphor of living constitutionalism that one finds most famously expressed in Justice Holmes opinion in Missouri v. Holland.
The paper concludes with a suggestion that the acquis, coupled with the relatively dynamic quality of European federalism, may help to explain the ECJ’s evolving jurisprudence of constitutional integration. Europe continues to grow, with the planned accession of ten new member states in 2004 and more on the way. In the United States, by contrast, no new member states have joined the Union since the late 1950s, and the prospects for further growth as a nation seem remote indeed. The closing of the border in the United States may have contributed to the perception that the project of federal integration has been completed. Such developments may have also contributed to a closing of the judicial mind to the possibility of further change in the nature of federal relationships.
Instabilitatea din aceasta tara frumoasa a Europei, nu-l face pe prim-ministrul belgian sa uite, pentru moment, ca a fi purtator de vorbe (chiar si prim-ministru) nu insemana si eterninatate. In Belgia detinerea puterii pana la anul este o astfel de eternitate.
Cu toatea acestea puteti citi aici promisiunile de echilibrare institutionala europena si un mic avant pasoptist de eliberare de sub dominatia celor mai mari.
Distanta dintre echilibrarea institutionala si echilibrarea rotilor nu are legatura cu echilibristica din circ, intrucat printre altele, domeniul cultura nu este unul de competenta exclusiva CE. Pentru cine mai crede ca putem include circul la cultura se inseala, penru ca intr-o lume in care totul se vinde, desigur, circul este o banala intrepridere.
Karen J. Alter, The European Court’s Political Power Across Time and Space, (January 28, 2009). Revue Française de Science Politique, Vol. 59, 2009; Northwestern Law & Econ Research Paper No. 09-03. Available at SSRN.
Autor al unei carti (OUP) – acest articol este o prezentare a cartii – despre nelimitata putere politica manifestata in limitele juridice ale CJCE, Karen J. Alter analizează opiniile fundamentale in materie (Eric Stein si Joseph Weiler), studiul fiind si o cronologie a puterii CJCE si extinderii acesteia in raport cu Tratatele.
Este CJCE o Curte influentata politic?
Intr-un asemenea studiu, intrebarea este retorica.
„In other respects, the shift of the French judicial system toward a Kelsenian ratio, can be appreciated in the context of the transformation of the European legal space in a true Grundrechtsgemeinshaft (community of rights). Indeed, at the supranational level, both the European Court of Justice and the European Court of Human Rights have began taking human rights seriously and claiming a constitutional status. The human rights’ case law of these two European courts is becoming increasingly influential and often used as an example even by the domestic courts of states with well-built ‘legal nationalism’. There is, therefore, a strong incentive (if not duty) for the national jurisdictions to elevate their standard of rights’ protection to comply with the growing attention to fundamental liberties at the European level.”
Gillian Moon, The WTO-Minus Strategy: Development and human rights under WTO law, (March 2008). University of New South Wales Faculty of Law Research Series. University of New South Wales Faculty of Law Research Series 2008. Working Paper 10. [*]
International trade law, human rights law and development studies share the common objective of promoting higher standards of living in the poorer countries of the world. Human rights and development scholars have been critical of the law of the World Trade Organisation (WTO), as implementing a development strategy which dominates and constrains the development strategy options of developing countries but which perceives development only in a narrow, economic sense. In this paper, the different theoretical underpinnings of international trade law and international human rights law are described and compared and their differing conceptions of development are examined from the perspective of the broader development discourse. The package of rights and obligations of developing countries under WTO law (the ‘WTO-Minus strategy’) is also described and examples of significant constraints placed by this package on the development strategy options open to developing countries regarding trade in goods are examined from the perspectives of the broader development discourse and international human rights norms. The capacity of the WTO to incorporate new and multidisciplinary knowledge about development is considered.
Sau din ciclul „ce se mai scrie pe la altii”…
Environmental Spill-overs from the European Court of Justice (*)
Prof. Dr. Jan H. Jans (*)
This paper illustrates that European environmental law is not just another sectoral policy area of the European Union. Over the years it has proven to have had a major impact on various general doctrines of European law. In that sense European environmental law had (and still have) important spill-overs to general European law. I will focus in particular on the role of the European Court of Justice and its case law.
Ei bine, rezumatul nu spune multe. Insa articolul e chiar interesant, mai ales ca ia in discutie, pe larg, problema temeiului juridic al unui act comunitar (temei juridic i.e. – dreptul mediului) si, evident, problema exercitarii unui control jurisdictional de catre CJCE asupra alegerii temeiului juridic mentionat…
Concluzia unui articol:
Van Gend is often casually compared to Marbury simply because in each case the high court declares itself to be the final arbiter of central government law. But there is a good deal more to the comparison than that. Both cases serve up what is perhaps the single most profound and complex issue of their respective constitutional systems: multiple competing claims of ultimate legal authority. In addressing this issue, both decisions make important claims for central judicial authority. And yet, both inaugurate a regime of mutual accommodation among the competing actors lasting to this very day.
To be sure, the nature of the competition in the two cases is rather different. In the United States, the competition is mostly horizontal and institutional, i.e. between the Court, the President, and Congress, as well as the People themselves. And the competition surrounds the interpretation of a single object: the United States Constitution. In Europe, the competition is mostly vertical and systemic, i.e. between the legal orders of the European Union and its Member States. Here the constitutional order of the European Union claims primacy over the constitutional orders of the Member States and vice versa. (In Europe there is also competition among different institutions to interpret the Union’s foundational charter. But this institutional competition is ultimately based on the deeper, systemic competition, i.e. a battle about which legal system(s) trumps the other(s) in cases of conflict.)
And yet, despite these differences, the practice of accommodating institutional pluralism in the United States shares important features with the practice of accommodating constitutional pluralism in Europe. By juxtaposing accommodation in the two systems, we may understand these practices far better than if we limit ourselves to only one or the other legal order. In particular, we recognize that actors in both systems seem to rely on considerations of voice, expertise, and rights to manage the pluralist standoff.
Articolul este denumit „Constitutionalism and Pluralism in Marbury and Van Gend„, Daniel Halberstam (*)
Rénovation du droit pénal des affaires : les 30 propositions du rapport Coulon
Le groupe de travail présidé par Jean-Marie Coulon, premier président honoraire de la cour d’appel de Paris, a remis au garde des Sceaux, le 20 février, son rapport consacré à la dépénalisation de la vie des affaires dont certaines propositions seront traduites dans un projet de loi (V. CDE 2008, entretien 1 ; Dr. pén. 2008, dossier 4).
Thomas A. Kelley III
Hakeem O. Yusuf
Luca G. Pes
Spre deosebire de viziunile holistice din dreptul nostru, altii scriu cu folos:
Sacha Prechal and Bert van Roermund, The Coherence of EU Law. The Search for Unity in Divergent Concepts, OPU, 2008 (*).
Cartea intra intr-o serie de lucrari care se preocupa de importanta limbajului juridic (sau a 23 de limbaje juridice sau a 27 sau si mai multe daca vedem regiunile autonome din Europa).
European System of Private Laws: An Economic Perspective (*)
A theoretical framework for the analysis and design of a European System of Private Laws and Regulations is presented. Since private laws also encompass a considerable amount of mandatory legal rules (increasingly fuzzy distinction between public and private law), both traditional private law rules that facilitate market exchange as well as mandatory (public or private law) rules for the regulation of markets are taken into account. Based upon a multi-level governance approach, economic theories of federalism and regulatory competition are used to analyze the optimal degree of centralisation/ decentralisation of legal rules for markets within a two-level legal system (EU and Member States). An overview of the most important criteria for the vertical allocation of regulatory powers and of different types of regulatory competition is given (including their advantages and disadvantages). The most important conclusion is that the optimal structure depends on the specific regulatory problem and detailed analyses are necessary, because complex trade off problems between manifold positive and negative effects of centralised/ decentralised solutions and regulatory competition can emerge. For the governance of such a European two-level system of private laws and regulations an appropriate shaping of conflict of laws- and choice of law-rules is crucial. The theoretical analysis of multi-level legal systems, especially in regard to their innovativeness and adaptability to changing circumstances and preferences, suggests that the EU should be more cautious in pursuit of legal harmonisation than they have been in the past.
Drafting laws in UK settings: implementing plain language and discourse? (*)
Legal English or legal Englishes? Differences in drafting techniques in the English-speaking world (*)
Oren Gazal-Ayal, University of Haifa, Faculty of Law
What explains the popularity of law and economics (L&E) in some academic communities and the scarcity of such scholarship in others? Many explanations have been given for the centrality of economic analysis in American legal thought and its marginality in Europe. This article examines what drives scholars to select L&E as a topic for research. It does so by implementing the methodology of many papers in the field – by assuming that regulation and incentives matter. Legal scholars face very different academic incentives in different parts of the world. In some countries, the academic standards for appointment, promotion and tenure encourage legal scholars to concentrate on L&E. In others, they strongly discourage such research. Thus, we should expect wide variation in the participation rate of legal scholars in the L&E discourse across countries. On the other hand, economists are evaluated with similar yardsticks everywhere, and thus their participation rate is likely to vary much less. The hypothesis of this paper is that academic incentives are a major factor in the level of participation in L&E scholarship. This „incentives hypothesis” is presented and then examined empirically with data gathered from the list of authors in L&E journals and the list of participants in L&E conferences. The data generally support the hypothesis. In legal academia, the incentives to focus research on L&E topics are the strongest in Israel, weaker in North America, and weakest in Europe. In fact, the data reveal that lawyers’ authorship of L&E papers weighted by population is about ten times higher in Israel than in North America; while in Europe it is almost five times lower than in North America. By comparison, the weighted participation level of economists – who face relatively similar academic environments across countries – in L&E research is not significantly different across countries.
Submitted: June 12, 2006 · Accepted: April 16, 2007 · Published: December 11, 2007
Intermediated Securities, Legal Risk, and the International Harmonisation of Commercial Law
Luc Thévenoz, Intermediated Securities, Legal Risk, and the International Harmonisation of Commercial Law, Duke Law School Legal Studies Paper No. 170 Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1008859
Investors do not physically hold their investment securities any more. Securities are held and transferred through a complex, sophisticated, and international network of financial intermediaries, including central securities depositories, investment banks, and brokers-dealers. Investors buy and sell their holdings by having book-entries made to their securities accounts; they provide collateral to secured lenders by book-entries or by control agreements. Because transfers and collateral transactions are critical to the liquidity of the financial markets and to financial stability, market participants and regulators have become increasingly concerned with the legal soundness, the internal consistency, and the international compatibility of national laws regulating the holding and transfer of securities held with an intermediary. This article examines how the international harmonisation of key rules of commercial law can contribute to the reduction of legal risk and discusses a draft convention prepared by the International Institute for the Unification of Private Law (UNIDROIT). Rather than addressing the numerous features of that draft, the author focuses on its methodology – the ‘functional approach’ – and finds that it is possible to create effective international treaty provisions, which contracting States may implement without disrupting their property law with respect to the structure and characterisation of investors’ interests in securities. This article tests the robustness of the functional approach by examining two critical issues: the definition of intermediated securities as the building block of international substantive rules and the choice among four internationally recognised methods for the transfer of intermediated securities and for their use as collateral.
Francezii au inceput sa curetze legile.
Au in gand sa faca o curatenie care sa lase in urma o ordine gasita doar in sistemul solar: astfel, oricine va descoperi o lege ileagala (cum o fi?) sau fara obiect va tzipa cat il tine gura si imediat treaba se va rezolva.
Avand in vedere ca un cuprins de Monitor (Jurnal) Oficial francez are – in fiecare zi – cate 4 pagini de sumar si cate 80 de pagini de texte, inseamna ca procesul va fi incheiat pe 3 septembrie 2398 ora 3 pm. Succes baieti si felicitari pentru idee!