Wouter P. J. Wils, Procedural Rights and Obligations of Third Parties in Antitrust Investigations and Proceedings by the European Commission

Pablo Ibáñez Colomo, What is an Abuse of a Dominant Position? Deconstructing the Prohibition and Categorizing Practices

e-Competitions Special Issue: Mitigation of fines

IES Policy Forum: Blockchain and Antitrust: The Next Tech Target in Competition Law Enforcement?, 16 January 2019, Brussels

Concurrences Nº3-2018

e-Competitions Special Issue: Interim Measures

C-68/18, Petrotel-Lukoil, pendinte

Gus Hurwitz, Fake News’s Not-So-Real Antitrust Problem: Content Remains King – – competitionpolicyinternational.com

Universitatea Petru Maior, Tîrgu Mureș „Conferința Națională Achiziții Publice în România – ediția a II-a. Modificarea legislației în 2017”, 23 ianuarie 2018

Ariel Ezrachi, The Competitive Effects of Parity Clauses on Online Commerce

Alison Jones, Distinguishing Legitimate Price Competition from Unlawful Exclusionary Behaviour: Reconciling and Rationalising the Case-Law

Dosar RomaniaEULaw: C-172/14, ING Pensii, hotararea din 16 iulie 2015

Concurrences. Revue des droits de la concurrence, 4/2014

Jitka Linhartová, Czech Republic: European Court Of Human Rights Rules That Czech Competition Authority Is Not Authorised To Enter Business Premises Without A Warrant, Mondaq, 4 November 2014.

„A Single Merger Control Standard for the US and Abroad?”, 09.09.2014

RRDE 2/2014: Wouter P.J. WILS, Compatibilitatea cu drepturile fundamentale a sistemului UE de executare a dreptului concurenţei, în care Comisia Europeană acţionează atât ca anchetator, cât şi ca decident în primă instanţă

9th GCLC Annual Conference: Antitrust Damages in EU Law and Policy, 7-8.11.2013

Damien Geradin, Ianis Girgenson, The Counterfactual Method in EU Competition Law: The Cornerstone of the Effects-Based Approach

Damien Geradin, Ianis Girgenson, The Counterfactual Method in EU Competition Law: The Cornerstone of the Effects-Based Approach (December 11, 2011). Available at SSRN

Abstract:

In Book IX of his History of Rome (written around 25 BC) Titus Livy speculates about a hypothetical confrontation between Rome and Alexander the Great. What if Alexander had not died at the end of the Asian campaign but had returned to Europe to attack Rome? Livy argues that Rome and Carthage would have joined forces to crush the Macedonian army.

Livy’s musings represent an early example of the counterfactual method. This method can be used to assess the effects of an actual or a hypothetical event. The counterfactual describes the world in the absence of that event. If the event has already occurred, one needs to build an alternative past (this is what Livy does when he imagines Alexander’s return to Europe). If the event has not yet taken place, it is necessary to contemplate an alternative future.

The use of the counterfactual under EU competition law goes back to the seminal judgment of the Court of Justice in the Société Technique Minière case. However, until recently, this method was confined to the area of merger control. Under Articles 101 and 102 TFEU, the European Commission and the EU Courts initially adopted a “form-based” approach. This approach paid limited (if any) attention to the effects of the relevant agreement or conduct on competition and consumers. Because the aim of the counterfactual technique is to analyse the effects of a given event it had little relevance under the form-based approach.

In recent years the Commission has transitioned towards the effects-based approach. The modernisation of EU antitrust enforcement caused a renewed interest in the counterfactual technique. Counterfactuals are discussed in various Article 101 guidelines and in the Article 102 Guidance Paper. In June 2011 the Commission published a draft Guidance Paper on quantification of antitrust damages, which contains a detailed analysis of various counterfactuals.

In this paper, we examine the use of the counterfactual method in EU competition law. In our analysis, we distinguish between ex ante control (merger control and Article 101 self-assessment) and ex post scenarios (investigations under Articles 101 and 102, damages litigation).

In Section II, we examine ex ante counterfactuals. We conclude that these counterfactuals are relatively easy to establish because they are usually based on the status quo ante. For example, in merger control the Commission compares the hypothetical post-transaction world with the actual pre-transaction situation. However, the development of prospective analysis leads to more sophisticated counterfactuals which incorporate future events, such as the target’s bankruptcy in the absence of the transaction. This forward-looking counterfactual should be based on highly likely future events; the Commission and the parties should not contemplate hypothetical scenarios which cannot be predicted with a high degree of certainty.

In Section III, we consider ex post counterfactuals. These counterfactuals are much more difficult to build because they are intrinsically speculative and are always based on a hypothetical scenario. In its recent decisional practice under Article 102 TFEU the Commission attempts to demonstrate anticompetitive effects and consumer harm by relying on various comparators (e.g., by comparing prices that prevail in the affected market to average EU-wide and OECD-wide prices). We believe that this benchmarking does not amount to the “appropriate counterfactual” advocated by the Guidance Paper. The Commission should use more elaborate and robust techniques, including economic models that simulate the likely market outcome in the absence of the alleged infringement. We also criticise the Commission for relying on the concept of “infringement by object” to avoid using the counterfactual technique under Article 101 TFEU.

Charles Gheur, Nicolas Petit (editors), Vertical Restraints and Distribution Agreements under EU Competition Law

Charles Gheur,  Nicolas Petit (editors), Vertical Restraints and Distribution Agreements under EU Competition Law, Edition Bruylant, 2011

Table des matières

Présentation :

This book is about the European rules governing distribution agreements, adopted in April 2010. Providing an exhaustive analysis of both EU Regulation 330/2010 and the Guidelines on Vertical Restraints, it also contains valuable contributions by eminent lawyers and economists.
· Cristina CAFFARRA, Vice President, Charles River Associate
· Andrès FONT GALARZA, Partner, Gibson Dunn LLP
· Constantin GISSLER, Government Affairs Advisor, Mayer Brown International
· David HENRY, Associate, McDermott Will & Emery LLP
· Etienne KAIRIS, Attorney, Loyens and Loeff
· Paul LUGARD, In-house counsel, Royal Philips Electronics
· Nicolas PETIT, Professor, University of Liege (ULg)
· John RATLIFF, Partner, WilmerHale
· Alexandre VANDENCASTEELE, Partner, Ashurst
· Emmerik VAN PARYS, Attorney, Loyens and Loeff
· Thibaud VERGE, Chief Economist, French Competition Authority
· Frank WIJCKMANS, Partner, Contrast

 

Ben Van Rompuy, The Impact of the Lisbon Treaty on EU Competition Law: A Review of Recent Case Law of the EU Courts

Ben Van Rompuy, The Impact of the Lisbon Treaty on EU Competition Law: A Review of Recent Case Law of the EU Courts, CPI Antitrust Chronicle, Vol. 1, December 2011. Available at SSRN

Abstract:

When the EU leaders agreed on the final version of the Lisbon Treaty, one particular amendment caused turmoil in the European competition law community. The Lisbon Treaty suppressed the 50-year-old commitment to “undistorted competition”, embedded in the fundamental provisions of the EC Treaty (Article 3(1)(g) EC). Since the Lisbon Treaty came into force on December 1, 2009, there has been no Treaty provision proclaiming adherence to the principle of undistorted competition. The substantive content of Article 3(1)(g) EC has been transferred to a Protocol (No 27) on the Internal Market and Competition, annexed to the Treaties.

Several commentators feared that the excise of the principle of undistorted competition from the front of the Treaties would downgrade the status of the competition rules within the EU legal order. They argued that this might inform the EU courts to depart from the pre-Lisbon case law, which frequently relied on Article 3(1)(g) EC as an interpretative guidance for the application of the Treaty rules on competition.

Two years after the Lisbon Treaty became law, it is now possible to review these gloomy forecasts in light of recent case law of the EU courts.

This article focuses on two long-standing fundamental principles, developed in the case law, that have been flagged by commentators as potentially in peril following the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty: (1) the constitutional status of the Treaty rules on competition; and (2) the concern of EU competition law with harm to an effective competition structure.

Ben Van Rompuy, “Thanks Nicolas Sarkozy, but no thanks.” CJEU rules on status of Protocol on Internal Market and Competition

Ben Van Rompuy, “Thanks Nicolas Sarkozy, but no thanks.” CJEU rules on status of Protocol on Internal Market and Competition, Kluwer Competition Law Blog, 25.11.2011

„When the EU leaders agreed on the final version of the Lisbon Treaty, one particular amendment caused turmoil in the European competition law community. The Lisbon Treaty repealed the 50-year-old commitment to “undistorted competition”, embedded in the fundamental provisions of the EC Treaty (Article 3(1)(g) EC), and moved it to a Protocol annexed to the Treaties.

 

French president Nicolas Sarkozy secured the change.”

Text integral

Assimakis Komninos, Continuity and Change in EU Competition Policy, Feb 16, 2010

Assimakis Komninos, Continuity and Change in EU Competition Policy, Feb 16, 2010, CPI

The entry into force of the Treaty of Lisbon on December 1, 2009 has brought profound changes to the EU. The Treaty on European Union has been substantially amended, while the venerable Treaty establishing the European Community (TEC) was entirely superseded by the new Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU). There has been a wholesale change of names and acronyms that even touched upon the conservative world of the EU Courts: the well-known to competition specialists “Court of First Instance” or “CFI” has now become the “General Court.” Even more dramatically, the noun and adjective “Community” is rendered obsolete and this covers competition law, too, so let us forget about “EC competition law” or “Community competition rules” and get used to “EU competition.” The numbering of the competition provisions has also changed: Articles 81 and 82 TEC are now Articles 101 and 102 TFEU.

At the same time, at the European Commission level, a Commissioner goes, Neelie Kroes, and a new Commissioner comes, Joaquín Almunia. Change of persons at the Director-General’s post, too: Philip Lowe is replaced by Alexander Italianer.

 

The interesting question is whether this change of persons, numbers, adjectives, and nouns extends also to the substance of EU competition law and policy, as formulated and applied by the European Commission and the EU Courts. In this short article, we argue that “EU competition” is likely to be very much the same as “EC” or “Community competition”. EU competition law and policy are now too mature and well-developed, for such changes to have any perceptible impact.

 

David Rosoenberg, A Critique of the European Commission’s Sector Inquiry into the Pharmaceutical Sector

David Rosoenberg, A Critique of the European Commission’s Sector Inquiry into the Pharmaceutical Sector, Antitrust, Volume 24, Number 2, Spring 2010

Proiect CSDE in Seria Consultari Europene: “Antitrust: o mai mare transparenta si previzibilitate a procedurilor” (CSDE-SCE-4)

Proiect CSDE in Seria Consultari Europene: “Antitrust: o mai mare transparenţă şi previzibilitate a procedurilor” (CSDE-SCE-4)

Centrul de Studii de Drept European din cadrul Institutului de Cercetari Juridice al Academiei Romane organizeaza o selectie de CV-uri pentru realizarea unui punct de vedere documentat în acest sens. Vor fi selectati experti care vor realiza cercetarea şi punctul de vedere, concretizate într-un material care va fi publicat ulterior.

Denumirea proiectului: „Antitrust: o mai mare transparenţă şi previzibilitate a procedurilor”. (CSDE-SCE-4)

„Cele mai bune practici privind procedurile antitrust” oferă cititorului o imagine de ansamblu asupra tuturor procedurilor antitrust, de la modul în care Comisia decide să acorde sau nu prioritate unui anumit dosar până la eventuala adoptare a unei decizii de către aceasta.

Documentul [prezentat de Comisia Europeană] îşi propune să îmbunătătească procedurile prin sporirea transparentei, asigurând, în acelasi timp, eficienţa investigaţiilor întreprinse de Comisie. Printre aspectele importante pe care Comisia le va avea în vedere atunci când îsi va modifica propriile proceduri se numără:

• initierea mai rapidă a procedurilor oficiale, imediat după încheierea fazei initiale de evaluare;

• posibilitatea de a organiza împreună cu părtile interesate reuniuni de analiză a situatiei în etape-cheie ale procedurilor;

• divulgarea principalelor observatii primite, inclusiv garantarea unui acces într-o etapă initială a procedurii la plângerea depusă, astfel încât părtile să îşi poată prezenta observaţiile în faza de investigare;

• anunţarea publică a initierii şi a încheierii procedurilor, precum şi a momentului în care a fost transmisă comunicarea privind obiecţiunile;

• oferirea de orientări privind utilizarea practică a noului instrument al procedurilor de angajare.”

Persoanele interesate pot trimite un CV, în format european, la adresa mihai.sandru@csde.ro până la data de 12 februarie 2010. Vor fi contactaţi doar candidaţii selectaţi.

Sunt de asemenea invitaţi să trimită un CV şi cei fi interesaţi să participe la elaborarea unor studii viitoare, cu precizarea domeniilor de interes. Aceste candidaturi vor servi la actualizarea bazei de date a CSDE.

Cercetarea trebuie definitivată, iar punctul de vedere redactat până la data de 26 februarie 2010.

Partener: Societatea de Ştiinţe Juridice.

Proiectul este sustinut de catre Wolters Kluwer.

Documente:

Anuntul Comisiei

Best Practices in proceedings concerning articles 101 and 102 TFEU

Best Practices on submission of economic evidence

Hearing Officers’ Guidance Paper

Informatii generale:

Tanya Roth, The Empire Struck Down? Microsoft Settles with the EU, December 29, 2009, FindLaw

Tanya Roth, The Empire Struck Down? Microsoft Settles with the EU, December 29, 2009, FindLaw

Has Microsoft finally met its match in the regulators for the European Union? That’s doubtful, but the software giant will have to change its ways or hand over a sizable amount of cash under the terms of the settlement reached last Wednesday.