Bogdan Iancu, Quod licet Jovi non licet bovi?: The Venice Commission as Norm Entrepreneur, Hague Journal on the Rule of Law April 2019, Volume 11, Issue 1, pp 189–221

Neil Walker, Intimations of Global Law, Cambridge University Press, 2014

Sylvain Brouard, Olivier Costa, Thomas König (Eds.), The Europeanization of Domestic Legislatures. The Empirical Implications of the Delors’ Myth in Nine Countries

Sylvain Brouard, Olivier Costa, Thomas König (Eds.), The Europeanization of Domestic Legislatures. The Empirical Implications of the Delors’ Myth in Nine Countries, Springer, 2012, VIII, 244 p. 41 illus., 30 in color.

Table of contents [pdf.]

Chapter 2. Thomas Konig, Tanja Dannwolf, Brooke Luetgert, EU Legislative Activities and Domestic Politics [pdf]

 

– Addresses several strong theses, including those of G. Majone, A. Moravcsik, and Martin and Vanberg, about Europeanization and legislation

– Includes an annex with extensive quantitative data on law Europeanization, detailed by country, type of norm, topic, period of time, etc

– Provides a method by which to measure Europeanization

In ten years 80 per cent of the legislation related to economics, maybe also to taxes and social aff airs, will be of Community origin.” This declaration has been largely quoted, paraphrased and deformed by different authors, creating a persistent myth according to which 80% of the legislative activity of the national legislatures would soon be reduced to the simple transposition of European norms”. This book addresses the topic of the scope and impact of Europeanization on national legislation, as a part of the Europeanization debate which raises normative concerns linked to the “democratic deficit” debate. The state of the art shows that there are many assumptions and claims on how European integration may affect national legislation and, more generally, domestic governance but that there is a lack of solid and comparative data to test them. The aim of the book is to give a solid and comparative insight into Europeanization focusing on effective outcomes in a systematic way. This book analyzes the period 1986-2008 and includes an introduction, a global overview of European legislative activities which set the background for Europeanization of national legislatures, 9 country contributions (8 EU member states + Switzerland) including systematic, comparative and standardized data, tables and figures, and a conclusion with a comparative analysis of the European and domestic reasons for Europeanization.

 

All national contributions conclude that Europeanization of national legislation is much more limited than assumed in the literature and public debate. It is limited to 10 to 30% of laws (depending on the country), far less than the 80% predicted by Jacques Delors and mentioned daily by medias and public opinion leaders to demonstrate EU domination on member states. Beside that general statement, the various chapters propose a deep insight on EU constraint over national legislation, providing much information on the kind of laws and policies that are Europeanized, the evolution of this process through time, the impact of Europeanization on the balance of powers and the relations between majority and opposition at national level, the strategies developed by national institutions in that context, and many other issues, making the book of inter

EUI: Ever-Closer in Brussels – Ever-Closer in the World? EU External Action after the Lisbon Treaty, 21.01.2011

The launch of the European External Action Service by the Lisbon Treaty coincides with a number of substantive changes to the legal framework of EU External Action. An ambitious agenda has been inserted into the primary law, calling on the EU in its relations with the world to “promote its values and interests”, “contribute to the protection of its citizens” and to “contribute to peace, security, the sustainable development of the Earth, solidarity and mutual respect among peoples, free and fair trade, eradication of poverty and the protection of human rights, in particular the rights of the child” (Art. 3(5) TEU). These principles are not to be pursued in isolation, but in a consistent manner and are to be “guided by the principles which have inspired [the EU’s] own creation” (Art. 21 TEU). This, in turn, requires also the Union institutions, as well as the Member States, to act in ways that do not contradict the EU position, a particular EU external policy or objective. It is the ambition of the EEAS to foster both consistency, as well as providing impetus to the EU’s external action. Looking at its structure, one can see that it is in itself a sui generis institution composed of officials from the Commission, Council and the Member States. This raises some fundamental questions that go well beyond those concerning which person is going to be the new EU ambassador in Washington, Beijing or Moscow. Above all, can this new sui generis institutional innovation live up to the ambitions of the sui generis entity that is the EU? What old problems does it purport to solve, and what are the big new question marks that it raises? In essence, to which extent does bundling the external objectives in the Treaty as well as pooling together the institutional resources in Brussels and the delegations render the EU actually an ever-closer actor in the world? Having in mind that the launch of the EEAS took place on 1st of December 2010, this workshop aims to address three big questions marks concerning EU external action after Lisbon: 1) the institutional allegiance of the EEAS, 2) the future of the “left out” DG Trade and the Common Commercial Policy, and 3) the protection of EU citizens abroad.

– Workshop organized by the RELEX Working Group with the support of Prof. Marise Cremona

Detalii

C-47/09, Prin autorizarea denumirii „ciocolată pură”, Italia a încălcat dreptul Uniunii

Dreptul Uniunii privind etichetarea produselor din cacao şi din ciocolată armonizează denumirile de vânzare ale acestora. În cazul în care conţin până la 5 % alte grăsimi vegetale decât untul de cacao (numite de substituţie), denumirea produselor rămâne neschimbată, dar etichetarea lor trebuie să cuprindă, cu litere îngroşate, menţiunea specifică „conține și alte grăsimi vegetale pe lângă untul de cacao”.Pentru produsele din ciocolată care conţin numai unt de cacao, este posibilă indicarea pe etichetă a acestei informaţii, cu condiția ca informaţia să fie corectă, imparțială, obiectivă și să nu inducă consumatorul în eroare.Reglementarea italiană prevede posibilitatea ca menţiunea „ciocolată pură” să fie adăugată sau integrată în denumirile de vânzare, sau să fie indicată în altă parte a etichetei produselor care nu conţin materii grase de substituţie, şi stabileşte amenzi administrative (de la 3 000 de euro la 8 000 de euro) pentru orice încălcare a acestei reglementări.Comisia a formulat la Curtea de Justiţie o acţiune în constatarea neîndeplinirii obligaţiilor împotriva Italiei, susţinând că acest stat membru a introdus o denumire suplimentară pentru produsele din ciocolată, în funcție de care se poate considera că acestea sunt „pure” sau „nu sunt pure”, ceea ce ar constitui o încălcare a directivei şi ar fi contrar jurisprudenţei Curţii. Comisia consideră că informarea consumatorului despre prezenţa sau lipsa grăsimilor de substituţie în ciocolată trebuie făcută prin etichetare și nu prin utilizarea unei denumiri de vânzare distincte.

Curtea aminteşte cu titlu introductiv că Uniunea Europeană a instituit o armonizare totală a denumirilor de vânzare privind produsele din cacao și din ciocolată destinate consumului uman în scopul garantării caracterului unitar al pieței interne. Aceste denumiri sunt atât obligatorii, cât și rezervate pentru produsele enumerate de legislaţia Uniunii. Având în vedere aceste precizări, Curtea constată că această legislaţie nu prevede denumirea de vânzare „ciocolată pură” şi nu permite introducerea unei asemenea denumiri de către legiuitorul național. În aceste condiții, reglementarea italiană este contrară sistemului de denumiri de vânzare stabilit de dreptul Uniunii.În plus, Curtea subliniază că sistemul dublei denumiri introdus de legiuitorul italian nu respectă nici cerințele impuse de dreptul Uniunii în ceea ce priveşte necesitatea ca consumatorul să dispună de o informație corectă, imparțială, obiectivă şi care nu este de natură să îl inducă în eroare. Astfel, s-a constatat deja în jurisprudenţa Curţii2 că adăugarea de grăsimi vegetale de substituţie la produse din cacao și din ciocolată care respectă conținuturile minime impuse de legislaţia Uniunii, nu schimbă substanțial natura acestor produse, până la transformarea acestora în produse diferite şi, prin urmare, nu justifică o diferenţă a denumirilor de vânzare.În schimb, precizează Curtea, potrivit legislaţiei Uniunii, inserarea în altă parte a etichetei a unei indicații imparțiale și obiective care informează consumatorii cu privire la lipsa, în produs, a altor grăsimi vegetale decât untul de cacao ar fi suficientă pentru a asigura o informare corectă a consumatorilor.În consecinţă, Curtea conchide că, întrucât permite menținerea a două categorii de denumiri de vânzare care desemnează în esență același produs, reglementarea italiană este de natură să inducă consumatorii în eroare și, aşadar, să aducă atingere dreptului acestora la o informare corectă, imparțială și obiectivă.Prin urmare, Curtea constată că Italia şi-a încălcat obligaţiile care îi revin în temeiul dreptului Uniunii.

Comunicat de presa

Ben Bouckley, Italy loses EU court battle to retain ‘unlawful’ chocolate sales name, http://www.foodnavigator.com

Vaughne Miller, How much legislation comes from Europe?

Vaughne MillerHow much legislation comes from Europe?, House of Commons, RESEARCH PAPER 10/62 13 October 2010 disponibil la adresa www.parliament.uk/briefing-papers/RP10-62.pdf

The former European Commission President, Jacques Delors, predicted in July 1988 that within ten years 80% of economic legislation, and perhaps also fiscal and social legislation, would be of European origin. Since then, Treaty amendments have given the European Union a role in several additional policy areas, which has contributed to a view that national legislatures are becoming ‘Europeanised’, both in terms of the quantity of EU laws and their impact on domestic law- and policy-making.In the UK data suggest that from 1997 to 2009 6.8% of primary legislation (Statutes) and 14.1% of secondary legislation (Statutory Instruments) had a role in implementing EU obligations, although the degree of involvement varied from passing reference to explicit implementation. Estimates of the proportion of national laws based on EU laws in other EU Member States vary widely, ranging from around 6% to 84%.This paper explores various approaches to the question of how much national law is based on or influenced by EU law.

Marlene Wind, The Nordics, the EU and the Reluctance Towards Supranational Judicial Review. JCMS: Journal of Common Market Studies,

Marlene Wind, The Nordics, the EU and the Reluctance Towards Supranational Judicial Review. JCMS: Journal of Common Market Studies, Vol. 48, Issue 4, pp. 1039-1063, September 2010. Available at SSRN

Abstract:

The Nordic countries have no tradition of judicial review by courts and have generally been hesitant to make use of the preliminary ruling procedure in the European Union. New data indicate that Nordic courts prefer to solve as many EU-related judicial disputes as possible without involving a supranational organ such as the ECJ. Building on two comprehensive surveys of Danish and Swedish courts and judges, this study challenges the theory of judicial empowerment when explaining judicial integration in the EU. The article argues that in order to explain when and why Member State courts make use of the preliminary ruling procedure, a much deeper understanding of the prevalent legal/political culture and concept of democracy in each Member State is required. In particular, the distinction between majoritarian versus constitutional democracies may help us understand why majoritarian democracies express greater scepticism towards supranational judicial review.