Din Irish Times: Gay lobby mangles meaning of marriage
Asadar, pe blog se cauta tot felul de lucruri; am mai scris si cu alte ocazii despre asta.
Bine, acum s-a cautat asa: “carti despre lobby la ue“. Zis-am sa raspundem, atunci. Asadar, bibliografii nu vom face aici. Pentru inceput recomandam o carte care merita citita/conspectata:
Machiavelli in Brussels: The Art of Lobbying the EU, scrisa de (auctorata, sic!) Rinus van Schendelen, si aparuta nu, nu la Vanju Mare University Press, ci la editura Universitatii din Amsterdam. Detalii aici.
Caracterul voluntar ar stimula inscrierea firmelor. Cititi la Euractiv.
Karen J. Alter, The European Court’s Political Power Across Time and Space, (January 28, 2009). Revue Française de Science Politique, Vol. 59, 2009; Northwestern Law & Econ Research Paper No. 09-03. Available at SSRN.
Autor al unei carti (OUP) – acest articol este o prezentare a cartii – despre nelimitata putere politica manifestata in limitele juridice ale CJCE, Karen J. Alter analizează opiniile fundamentale in materie (Eric Stein si Joseph Weiller), studiul fiind si o cronologie a puterii CJCE si extinderii acesteia in raport cu Tratatele.
Este CJCE o Curte influentata politic?
Intr-un asemenea studiu, intrebarea este retorica.
Un articol documentet pe euractiv.com
Parearea mea, ca nu sunt nici economist, nici specialist este ca aceste cumparaturi – achizitii publice – de culoare verde sunt mai scumpe si sunt in avantajul unora.
Ba chiar, incalca actualele reglementari referitoare la concurenta deschisa, ca nu toata lumea are acces la tehnologia green.
Tony Bunyan, FOI in the EU: When is a “document” not a “document”?, Statewatch, September 2008.
The European Commission has put forward a number of changes to the Regulation on access to EU documents adopted in 2001. Controversially it proposes to change the definition of a “document” which in turn affect which would or would not be listed on its public register of documents. Does this have anything to do with the fact that the European Ombudsman has just ruled that the Commission must abide by the existing definition of a “document” in the Regulation and that it must list all the documents it holds on its public register?
Stiati ca Marea Britanie este una dintre cele mai avangardiste state?
Staiti ca sistemul de juri este perdant?
Dar daca le combinam?
Paul M Collins, Friends of the Supreme Court: Interest Groups and Judicial Decision Making, Oxford University Press, 2008. [*]
The U.S. Supreme Court is a public policy battleground in which organized interests attempt to etch their economic, legal, and political preferences into law through the filing of amicus curiae (“friend of the court”) briefs. In Friends of the Supreme Court: Interest Groups and Judicial Decision Making, Paul M. Collins, Jr. explores how organized interests influence the justices’ decision making, including how the justices vote and whether they choose to author concurrences and dissents. Collins presents theories of judicial choice derived from disciplines as diverse as law, marketing, political science, and social psychology. This theoretically rich and empirically rigorous treatment of decision-making on the nation’s highest court, which represents the most comprehensive examination ever undertaken of the influence of U.S. Supreme Court amicus briefs, provides clear evidence that interest groups play a significant role in shaping the justices’ choices.
Fragmente aici.
Articolul este fara indoiala interesant.
Dino Falaschetti, CAN LOBBYING PREVENT ANTICOMPETITIVE OUTCOMES? EVIDENCE ON CONSUMER MONOPSONY IN TELECOMMUNICATIONS, Journal of Competition Law and Economics Advance Access published online on June 4, 2008 [*]
When basic competition rules cannot stop market power abuses, industry-specific regulations can improve economic performance. But regulations are also more immediately exposed to political pressures than are judicially administered antitrust laws, and this exposure can cause regulations to serve distributional rather than efficiency goals. Instead of supporting a Chicago School hypothesis where distributional forces tend to favor producers, however, I find evidence that regulations can inefficiently expand consumer surplus when producers lack a political voice. In particular, local exchange carriers maintain significantly smaller capital stocks in states that restrict campaign contributions from regulated utilities. This relationship is difficult to rationalize as either a statistical artifact or evidence that campaign finance laws discourage producers from restraining trade. Indeed, rather than endowing producers with political currency to capture regulators, allowances for campaign contributions appear to have strengthened competition by discouraging regulatory takings and balancing monopsonistic pressures from consumer-voters. These results highlight an empirically important potential for regulations to favor consumers overly, and strengthen arguments against consumer surplus as an objective for competition policies.
