Guido A.Ferrarini, Geoffrey P. Miller, A Simple Theory of Takeover Regulation in the United States and Europe (October 30, 2009). Cornell International Law Journal, Forthcoming; NYU Law and Economics Research Paper No. 09-42. Available at SSRN.
Abstract:
This paper presents a simple model of takeover regulation in a federal system. The theory has two parts. First, the model predicts that the rules applicable at more general political levels will be more favorable to takeover bids than will the rules applicable at local levels. The reason is that unlike bidders, who do not know ex ante where they will find targets, targets can concentrate their political activities knowing that the law of their jurisdiction will apply to any attempt to take them over. On the other hand, at more general political levels this advantage for target firms disappears, so the rules are expected to be less target-friendly. This is in fact the pattern we observe both in the United States and the European Union. Second, the model predicts that rules on takeovers will reflect the degree of concern that targets have about potential hostile bids. Where firms are well-protected against unfriendly takeovers – for example, in jurisdictions where companies are under family control – takeover regulation is likely to be less target-friendly than in jurisdictions where potential targets are more exposed to a hostile acquisition. This pattern is also observed in takeover regulation.
Avizul Comitetului Economic și Social European privind propunerea de directivă a Parlamentului European și a Consiliului de modificare a Directivelor 77/91/CEE, 78/855/CEE și 82/891/CEE ale Consiliului și a Directivei 2005/56/CE privind obligațiile de raportare și întocmire a documentației necesare în cazul fuziunilor și divizărilor
2009/C 218/05, 11 septembrie 2009
[*]
Christiana H.J.I. Panayi, Corporate Mobility in Private International Law and European Community Law: Debunking Some Myths. YEARBOOK OF EUROPEAN LAW, Eeckhout, P., Tridimas, T., eds., Vol. 28, Oxford University Press, 2009; Queen Mary School of Law Legal Studies Research Paper No. 26/2009. Available at SSRN.
Riccardo Croce, Nikos Dimopoulos, Philippe Billiet, Arbitration Commitments under EC Merger Procedures: a hybrid and successful form of Arbitration, AIA, July, 2009, p. 4-8. [*]
Horst G. M. Eidenmueller, Andreas Engert, LarsHornuf, The Societas Europaea: Good News for European Firms, May 25, 2009. Available at SSRN.
Abstract:
When Council Regulation (EC) No 2157/2001 on the Statute for a European Company (Societas Europaea – SE) became effective on 8 October 2004, it offered publicly traded companies, for the first time, a choice between competing company laws, namely the national law of the company’s home state and the law of the supranational SE. Using an event study methodology, we analyse a unique dataset of publicly traded firms that have announced to re-incorporate under the SE Regulation. We find the re-incorporation decision to have a positive impact on firms’ stock market value. The abnormal returns associated with re-incorporating as an SE increase over the years, which we interpret as the result of declining legal uncertainty and a rising reputational value of the SE corporate form.
Blanaid Clarke, The Takeover Directive: Is a Little Regulation Better Than No Regulation?, European Law Journal. Oxford: Mar 2009. Vol. 15, Iss. 2.
Abstract (Summary)
This article examines Directive 2004/25/EC [RO] on Takeover Bids through a regulatory lens in order to determine its effectiveness as a regulatory mechanism. A central regulatory problem for European legislators is to determine the optimal balance between harmonisation and diversity, and the directive reflects the balance which was struck. The article questions whether the resulting ‘light regulatory touch’ may have jeopardised the existing efficient self-regulatory regime which operates in the UK (the largest European takeover market), while simultaneously undermining the directive’s goal of facilitating takeovers and yielding a level playing field.
Dirk Van Gerven, Paul Storm (ed), The European Company, Vol. 2, Cambridge University Press, 2008.
Contents
Preface Dirk Van Gerven; Part I. The SE in its Sixth Year: Some Early Impressions Paul Storm; Part II. National reports from EU Member States: 1. Bulgaria Raina Dimitrova; 2. Cyprus Alexandros Tsadiras; 3. Czech Republic Jan Zrzavecký and Jan Dědič; 4. France Jean-Marc Desaché; 5. Greece Stefanos Charaktiniotis; 6. Ireland Michael A. Greene and Keavy Ryan; 7. Italy Francesco Gianni; 8. Latvia Dace Silava-Tomsone, Iveta Mikelsone and Jurgita Spigule; 9. Luxembourg Patricia Ferrante and Marc Meyers; 10. Malta Rosanne Bonnici; 11. Portugal Margarida Pereira Barrocas; 12. Romania Carmen Peli and Georgeta Dinu; 13. Slovenia Mateja Ogrič, Jurij Dolžan and Eva Pergarec; 14. Spain Miguel Liria Plañiol; National Reports from EEA Member States: 15. Liechtenstein Andreas Schurti and Alexander Appel; 16. Norway Lars Kristian Sande; Annexes: Annex Ia. Council Regulation (EC) N° 2157/2001 of 8 October 2001 on the Statute for a European Company (SE); Annex Ib. Public limited-liability companies referred to in Article 2(1) of the Regulation; Annex Ic. Public and private limited-liability companies referred to in Article 2(2) of the Regulation; Annex II. Council Directive 2001/86/EC of 8 October 2001 supplementing the Statute for a European Company with regard to the involvement of employees; Annex III. List of national laws implementing the Regulation and the Directive.
CJCE, Comisia/Franta, C-214/07, Hotărârea din 13 noiembrie 2008. [*]
Obiectul actiunii in neîndeplinirea obligaţiilor Comisiei il constituie nerespectarea Deciziei 2004/343/CE a Comisiei din 16 decembrie 2003 privind schema de ajutor pusă în aplicare de Franta în privinta preluării întreprinderilor aflate în dificultate, JO L 108, p. 38. [*]
“În ceea ce priveste întreprinderile beneficiare care si au încetat activitatea, menţionate în corespondenţa referitoare la executarea deciziei, Comisia sustine că, în cazul transferului de active, trebuie să se examineze conditiile financiare ale tranzactiei pentru a se asigura că transferul a fost realizat în conformitate cu conditiile pietei.” (par. 15)
“Potrivit jurisprudentei, elementul de ajutor poate fi considerat, cu această conditie, inclus în prețul de cumpărare, astfel încât cumpărătorul nu poate, în principiu, să fie considerat beneficiar al unui avantaj (Hotărârea din 20 septembrie 2001, Banks, C 390/98, Rec., p. I 6117, punctul 77, si Hotărârea din 29 aprilie 2004, Germania/Comisia, C 277/00, Rec., p. I 3925, punctul 80), beneficiul ajutorului fiind păstrat de către cedent.” (par. 16)
“În orice caz, recuperarea ajutorului nu ar putea fi condiţionată de indicarea valorii ajutorului în actul de transfer al activelor. În caz contrar, ar fi extrem de uşor să fie repus în discuţie efectul util al normelor privind ajutoarele de stat. Ar fi suficient ca părţile la o tranzacţie efectuată la un preţ inferior preţului pieţei să omită să menţioneze în contract transferul ajutorului. Or, verificarea existenţei unui transfer al ajutorului către dobânditor nu ar putea depinde numai de voinţa părţilor la tranzacţie.” (par. 18)
Aceasta [Republica Franceză] susţine că, atât pentru transferurile de active realizate prin cesiuni pe cale contractuală, cât si pentru cele care au intervenit în cadrul unor proceduri de redresare si de lichidare judiciară, autorităţile fiscale nu pot aprecia dacă transferurile în cauză s-au desfăsurat în condiţii normale de piaţă. [par. 35]
Într adevăr, dacă există o piaţă imobiliară, nu ar exista o piaţă a bunurilor industriale de ocazie. Asadar, pentru acestea nu este disponibilă nicio referinţă pentru determinarea unui preţ de piaţă în momentul transferului.[par. 36]
În ceea ce privește cesiunile de active pe cale contractuală realizate de întreprinderile care şi au încetat activitatea, recuperarea ajutoarelor nu ar avea niciun temei juridic în cazurile în care transferul ajutorului către dobânditor nu ar fi fost menţionat în actul de cesiune. [par. 41]
Aprecierea Curţii
În caz de dificultăţi, Comisia si statul membru, în temeiul normei care impune statelor membre şi instituţiilor comunitare obligaţii reciproce de cooperare loială, care rezultă în special din articolul 10 CE, trebuie să colaboreze cu bună credinţă pentru depăşirea acestor dificultăţi, cu respectarea deplină a prevederilor tratatului şi în special a celor privind ajutoarele de stat (a se vedea Hotărârea din 12 mai 2005, Comisia/Grecia, C 415/03, Rec., p. I 3875, punctul 42 şi jurisprudenţa citată). [par. 45]
Condiţia unei imposibilităţi absolute de executare nu este îndeplinită atunci când statul membru pârât se limitează să comunice Comisiei dificultăţi juridice, politice sau practice pe care le prezintă punerea în aplicare a deciziei, fără a întreprinde un veritabil demers pe lângă întreprinderile în cauză pentru recuperarea ajutorului şi fără a propune Comisiei modalităţi alternative de punere în aplicare a deciziei, care să permită depăşirea dificultăţilor (a se vedea în special Hotărârea din 14 decembrie 2006, Comisia/Spania, C 485/03-C 490/03, Rec., p. I 11887, punctul 74 şi jurisprudenţa citată). [par. 46]
În acest caz, elementul de ajutor a fost evaluat la preţul pieţei şi a fost inclus în preţul de cumpărare, astfel încât cumpărătorul nu poate fi considerat beneficiar al unui avantaj în raport cu alţi operatori de pe piaţă (Hotărârea Germania/Comisia, citată anterior, punctul 80). În caz contrar, nu poate fi exclus ca cesionarul să poată, dacă este cazul, să fie obligat la restituirea ajutoarelor în cauză, în condiţiile în care s ar stabili că păstrează beneficiul efectiv al avantajului concurenţial legat de beneficiul respectivelor ajutoare (Hotărârea Germania/Comisia, citată anterior, punctul 86). [par. 58]
Pentru verificarea condiţiilor financiare ale cesiunii, autorităţile naţionale pot lua în considerare, printre altele, forma utilizată pentru cesiune, de exemplu cea a adjudecării publice, considerată că garantează o vânzare în condiţiile pieţei. [par. 59]
De asemenea, acestea pot lua în considerare, printre altele, o eventuală expertiză desfăsurată cu ocazia cesiunii. [par. 60]
În cazul în care activele au fost preluate de mai mulţi dobânditori diferiţi, nimic nu se opune, în principiu, să fie verificată conformitatea condiţiilor financiare ale fiecăreia dintre operaţiuni cu condiţiile pieţei. [par. 61]
În ipoteza unei cesiuni de active pe cale contractuală, recuperarea ajutoarelor de la cesionar nu poate fi subordonată menţionării exprese în act a unui transfer al acestor ajutoare. Aceasta poate fi operată atunci când cesionarul trebuia să aibă cunostinţă despre existenţa ajutoarelor si despre o procedură de control desfăsurată de către Comisie. [par. 62]
Prin neexecutarea în termenul stabilit a Deciziei 2004/343/CE a Comisiei din 16 decembrie 2003 privind schema de ajutor pusă în aplicare de Franţa în privinţa preluării întreprinderilor aflate în dificultate, Republica Franceză nu si a îndeplinit obligaţiile care îi revin în temeiul articolului 5 din decizia menţionată.
Comisia se bucura: State aid: Commission welcomes Court ruling on recovery of illegal aid, 13.11.2008.
Michel Struys, Jeremy Robinson, EC Merger Decisions Digest. The Complete Guide to EC Merger Regulations Decisions, Kluwer Law International, 2008 [*]
Description
With company mergers an ever-present feature of daily business life in Europe and the wider world, it is essential that practitioners’ legal, corporate and financial become familiar not only with the regulatory law governing merger activity but also with the growing body of case law embodied in the decisions of the European Commission. EC Merger Decisions Digest is the resource that all business people and their advisers will use for this knowledge and information. There is no better tool for rapid and efficient analysis of prospective mergers.
Written by two outstanding practitioners specialising in EU competition law and EU regulatory matters, the Digest is a regularly updated looseleaf that provides not only every decision in concise summary/analysis format of the European Comission under the EC Merger Regulation, but a clear and easy-to-read presentation of the economic principles underlying the market definitions upheld by the Commission. It includes such useful features as the following:
standardised summaries of every decision of the European Commission under the EC Merger Regulation, grouped together in some 30 chapters according to the main economic sector concerned;
an easy-to-read, very brief and straightforward summary of the key procedural and substantive points of each decision;
an interest rating for each case from least interesting to most interesting;
an invaluable summary of product and geographic market definitions upheld and left open by the Commission by product sector;
a straightforward summary of the basic economic principles underlying how markets are defined; and
a user guide to obtain maximum and speediest benefit from the work.
The text is in English, even if the language of the original decision is not.
Practitioners and advisers from the diverse sectors of corporate and competition law, investment banking or private equity will quickly find information relating to the product and geographic market definitions upheld by the Commission, and readily understand the principles underlying the Commission¿s findings. Users will rapidly find the most important decisions in each sector, obtain the key facts, and identify the reasons underlying each decision. Each summary contains full reference citations to the original text of the decision.
With the Digest, practitioners and business people can be confident of uncovering every potential pitfall and considered every advantage possible in the circumstances of any deal, right up to the last minute of the process. With its regular updates, economic sector focus, and uncompromising practical orientation toward M&A practice, EC Merger Decisions Digest is the only product of its kind in any format. It would be hard to name an item in a European company law library that will get more use, day in and day out, for years to come.
Price includes (all supplements which will be published in 2005) Please note when ordering this publication, you will automatically be registered to receive all future updates and supplements. As of January 2006 an invoice will accompany the new updates.
Table of Contents
General Section
Table of Contents.Foreword
How to Use this Guide
Index of Decisions
Jurisdictional Rules
Chemicals
Construction
Defence
Education
Energy
Farming and Land Management
Financial Services
Food, Beverage and Tobacco
Hotels and Leisure
Industrial Goods
Insurance
Intermediary Goods
Internet
IT and Telecoms Hardware/Software
Media and Printing
Minerals and Metals
Packaging
Pharmaceutical Products
Professional and Health Services
Post and Telecoms
Property
Retail Manufacturing
Textiles and Leather
Transport Manufacture
Transport Services
Waste Management
Water
Wholesale and Retail Trade
Wood and Wood Products
Michel Tison, Hans De Wulf, Christoph Van der Elst, Reinhard Steennot (ed.), Perspectives in Company Law and Financial Regulation, Cambridge University Press, 2009
Sumarul acestei carti este serios si este vizibil aici.
Beate Sjafjell, Towards a Sustainable European Company Law. A Normative Analysis of the Objectives of EU Law, with the Takeover Directive as a Test Case’, Kluwer Law International, 2008.
Din Norvegia, profesoara la Oslo [*], se spune ca nimic nu e sigur, daca nu este si adevarat. Cartea este teza de doctorat a autoarei, putin revizuita.
Jevgeni Robakov, Societas Europaea: Analysis of adoption and practical functioning, 2007, [*]
cam eseu, de pus la bibliografie…
The SE is furthermore often observed as a useful but still mainly theoretical legal instrument, playing an indispensable part in the overall development of European company law.Political motives seem to be considerably heavier while discussing the question of necessity of adoption that later attracted so little interest.
DIRK ZETZSCHE, SHAREHOLDER PASSIVITY, CROSS-BORDER VOTING AND THE SHAREHOLDER RIGHTS DIRECTIVE, Journal of Corporate Law Studies, Volume 8, Number 2, October 2008 , pp. 289-336(48) [*]
Abstract:
This paper focuses on the low cross-border turnout of shareholders at shareholder meetings of European issuers. It presents the data that are available on cross-border voting and examines the reasons behind the low cross-border turnout, in relative terms. Opposing the traditional view among US law and economics scholars, this paper holds that law matters in the efforts to facilitate cross-border voting. This is particularly true for procedural requirements. Thus, legislative action, such as the Shareholder Rights Directive, may indeed have beneficial effects on voting turnouts across Europe. The impact of the Shareholder Rights Directive on procedural costs of shareholders is examined in the second part of the paper. The Directive seeks to lessen procedural costs through the use of the internet. While it does not force a kick-start of EUMember States into the digital age, it constitutes a significant step forward in harmonising the procedure of shareholder meetings across Europe. From a procedural point of view, cross-border investors are likely to benefit from the legal certainty that the Directive provides, as well as the lower costs for the digital exercise of shareholder rights in those states which have previously refrained from implementing digital options for shareholders. In the third part of the paper, whether-and, if so, which-additional steps are necessary in order to further reduce procedural costs of cross-border voting is assessed. It is posited that the Shareholder Rights Directive failed to mandate an efficient regime to govern the identification and authorisation of shareholders who hold their shares within a chain of intermediaries, and four remedies to be taken by the European Parliament are suggested.
John Armour, David A. Skeel, The Divergence of U.S. and UK Takeover Regulation, Regulation, Vol. 30, No. 3, Fall 2007
Available at SSRN.
Abstract:
Hostile takeovers are commonly thought to play a key role in rendering managers accountable to dispersed shareholders. Yet, surprisingly little attention has been paid to the very significant differences in takeover regulation between the two most prominent practitioners of hostile takeover, the United Kingdom and the United States. In the UK, defensive tactics by target managers are prohibited, whereas in the United States, Delaware law gives managers a good deal of room to maneuver. We examine the evolution of the two regimes from a public choice perspective, and argue that the differences between the two countries is influenced by differences in the mode of regulation – that is, by who it is that does the regulating.
António Goucha Soares, “National Champions” Rhetoric in European Law – Or the many faces of protectionism, (2008) 31, World Competition, pp. 353-368 [*]Summary:
The article aims to debate the issue of national champions regarding merger operations with a Community dimension. It starts with a brief overview of the legal framework for merger review in European Union law, as well as a reference to the division of competences between the Union and the Member States in this field. Then, it analyses the scope of Member State action regarding merger operations with a Community dimension, namely the clause to protect national legitimate interests. After some illustrations of recent cases concerning Member States’ defence of national champions, the article devotes the last part to a reflection of two related issues: the concept of industrial policy and the new challenges raised by sovereign wealth funds.
Bruce Abramson, ARE “ONLINE MARKETS” REAL AND RELEVANT? FROM THE MONSTER-HOTJOBS MERGER TO THE GOOGLE-DOUBLECLICK MERGER, Journal of Competition Law and Economics Advance Access published online on September 26, 2008 [*]
This article examines two Internet merger investigations from 2001 and 2007 to answer the question of whether there is such a thing as a distinct “Internet market,” and if so, how an antitrust analysis of such a market should differ from parallel analyses applied to more conventional markets. A quick comparison of two Internet advertising mergers from different stages of the Internet’s existence demonstrates two things. First, as the novelty of the Internet wears off, online merger analysis looks increasingly like offline merger analysis. Second, most of the things that make online mergers interesting have little to do with competition law.
Concentrations: la Commission autorise le projet de rachat de Volkswagen par Porsche, Bruxelles, le 23 juillet 2008, IP/08/1201 [EN, FR]
La Commission européenne a autorisé, en vertu du règlement CE sur les concentrations, le projet de rachat de Volkswagen Allemagne par la société allemande Porsche. Après avoir examiné l’opération, elle a conclu que l’opération n’entraverait pas de manière significative l’exercice d’une concurrence effective dans l’Espace économique européen (EEE) ou une partie substantielle de celui-ci.
Aceasta editie supliment, pe langa editia inaugurala a seriei, adauga si aduce la zi legislatia din mai mlte state dar si cea din Uniunea Europeana.
Editia inaugurala: Maher Dabbah, Paul Lasok (General editor), Merger Control Worldwide 3 Volume Set, Cambridge University Press, 2008 [*] Capitolul referitor la Romania ii apartine lui Gelu Goran.
Editia supliment: Maher Dabbah, Paul Lasok (General editor), Merger Control Worldwide. Second Supplement to the First Edition, Cambridge University Press, 2008 [*] De la p. 41 la 45 cartea se refera si la Uniunea Europeana. O sinteza e o sinteza.
