Dreptul comunitar al afacerilor. blog

Recursul “Clubului Lombard” a fost respins

CJCE, cauzele conexate, C-125/07 P, C-133/07 P, C-135/07 P si C-137/07 P, Erste si altii/Comisia, hotararea din 24 septembrie 2009, nepublicata

CJCE a respins numeroasele motive de recurs ale societatilor bancare – “Clubul Lombard”.


Raportul pentru 2008 al Comisiei Europene privind politica de concurenta

Sau, precum se exprima “expertii cu expertiza” in limba romgleza vernaculara: “raportul pă competenţie” din 2008.

RO, EN, FR. De asemenea, este interesant si documentul insotitor - SEC(2009)1004, disponibil doar in EN & FR.


CE: Raportul anual privind politica în domeniul concurenței pe anul 2008

CE: Raportul anual privind politica

in domeniul concurentei pe anul 2008

prima dată un capitol referitor la un subiect considerat a avea o importanță deosebită
în acest domeniu. Subiectul ales pentru acest an este „Carteluri și consumatori”

Raportul anual privind politica în domeniul concurenței conține pentru prima dată un capitol referitor la un subiect considerat a avea o importanță deosebită în acest domeniu. Subiectul ales pentru acest an este „Carteluri și consumatori”.

Comunicatul de presa.


Codes of Conduct and Harmonization of Professional Standards in the EU (Panagiotis Delimatsis)

Panagiotis Delimatsis, ‘Thou Shall Not…(Dis)Trust’: Codes of Conduct and Harmonization of Professional Standards in the EU, July 8, 2009. TILEC Discussion Paper No. 2009-029. Available at SSRN.

Abstract:
In the absence of the country of origin principle and thus quasi-automatic mutual recognition, the creation of codes of conduct (CoC) at a European level as an alternative, soft method of rule-making acquires new dynamics. Pan-European CoC are an instrument that can be used to reinforce trust in the quality of the legal regimes and qualification or licensing requirements of the other MS dealing notably with issues such as commercial communications or rules of professional ethos. CoC, while voluntary, soft-law instruments, are considered as partaking in the effort to increase the ‘awareness of Europeanness’, pursue legitimate objectives that are accepted as valid at Community level and ultimately guarantee a high level of quality commensurate with the ever-increasing expectations of the EU citizens with a view to enhancing trust among MS as to the equivalence of services and service suppliers originating in other MS. Nevertheless, effective market access for service suppliers can depend heavily on such codes, which are typically adopted by non-state bodies when they exercise their legal autonomy. SUH (mostly voluntary) rules of conduct can hinder the intra-EU movement of professionals. Hence, liberalization of factor mobility enshrined in primary and secondary EC law or agreed on during state-to-state negotiations at a multilateral level can be jeopardized by the adoption and application of such codes. This paper aims to explore the impact of CoC on the liberalization of professional services.


Drepturile omului & societatile comerciale sau procedura Comisiei in dosare in materia concurentei & jurisprudenta CEDO

Un articol interesant din Wall Street Journal.

JASON L RILEY – Do Companies Have Human Rights?

Intel last week challenged the European Commission’s €1 billion fine for abusing its dominant position. In addition to the usual antitrust arguments, the chipmaker also raised human rights concerns about the decision. What may sound like a Hail Mary defense actually has quite a good chance of success.

The European Convention on Human Rights far more directly and expressly applies to businesses and not just individuals than the U.S. Bill of Rights. That’s why the Strasbourg-based Court of Human Rights accepted in 1996 a complaint from a British savings and loans firm that challenged its corporate tax assessment on human rights grounds. (National Provincial Building Society v. United Kingdom).

The fundamental problem for the Commission is that the core procedural rules of European Union competition regulation date back to 1962, before the development of most of the ECHR case law. A series of ECHR cases over the last decade have already raised human rights concerns about EU procedures. These include concerns over the defendant’s limited access to the Commission’s file to the fact that the Commission conducts “dawn raids” on corporate offices without full judicial warrants.

The main concern, though, is that the Commission is investigator, prosecutor and judge all in one. Such an accumulation of powers flies in the face of traditional Western concepts of due process.

Originally, this did not matter much as the procedures were used more to develop the law than punish companies. Brussels didn’t impose any fines until 1969 and they remained rare and low thereafter for a very long time.

Only over the last decade have fines become much higher and more frequent. While the fines against Intel (€ 1 billion) and Microsoft (consecutively €497, €280 and €899 million) for abusing their respective dominant positions have grabbed the headlines, the Commission more often imposes enormous fines for price-fixing. The top ten over the last decade are Saint Gobain €896 million; EON €553 million, GDF €553 million, ThyssenKrupp €479 million, F. Hoffman La Roche €462 million, Siemens €396 million, Pilkington €370 million, Sasol €318 million, ENI €272 million and Lafarge €249 million.

In cases where huge fines are imposed, and particularly in cartel cases,it becomes much more difficult for the Commission to argue that the ECHR standards are not relevant because Brussels is not involved in criminal law. Even though the Commission regulations state that its fines are “not of a criminal law nature,” they clearly are as far as the Strasbourg court is concerned. Case law at least as far back as the Stenuit case in the early 1990s (a case involving French competition law where the French watchdog had actually weaker fining powers than the Commission) is clear that where a fine is intended to punish or deter and is of general application, it is of a criminal law nature. And for the Strasbourg court, criminal law cases impose a higher standard of human rights compliance on the Commission than in mere administrative law.

In the 1997 Findlay case involving an assault charge before a British military tribunal, the Strasbourg court took the view that where a serious criminal charge was laid down it must be heard by an independent judge at first instance. This raises serious questions about the Brussels procedures given the Commission’s triple powers and that access to a judge is only available on appeal.

The issue thus is whether an antitrust offence resulting in an enormous fine can count as a criminal charge. The difficulty for the Commission is that its fines are so much larger than for any other civil offence under European law. Plus, particularly in price-fixing cases, the Commission tends to deploy typical criminal prosecutor rhetoric, referring to cartelists as “cancer on the economy” who “swindle their clients.”

The Commission might thus be well-advised to preempt the human rights challenge and insert an independent judge into its procedures. Brussels would actually benefit from such a change. The Commission has been tremendously successful in busting cartels in the last decade. Too successful—as it now has a backlog of almost 100 cartel cases and at best, due to its antiquated administrative procedures, can only hand down 8 to ten decisions a year. An independent judge could provide relief.

Instead of the Commission issuing a statement of objections; receiving an extensive written reply from the defendant; organizing an oral hearing (which incidentally takes place wholly in private); holding a meeting of national antitrust agencies to discuss the case and then drafting a 200-page decision that has to be translated into 19 official languages, the Commission would just charge the defendant before a Brussels-based independent competition tribunal.

Establishing an independent court would do more than cut the Commission’s workload. Fighting serious antitrust offenders—such as price-fixers who have been caught red-handed—in an open court before the media would probably force most of the many firms to settle. Few such businesses would want the Commission to air their violations in front of the entire Brussels antitrust press corps.

An independent tribunal would also help solve other problems. For instance, the Commission’s current fining policy has no answer to the “rogue director problem.” This is where the main board may have a strong anti-price-fixing policy but a manager of a subsidiary fixes prices to increase his own compensation and benefits. Current EU anti-trust law can’t target individual employees. With an independent judge in place it would be possible to introduce individual civil sanctions against such rogue directors.

The current Commission review of its own regulation is therefore an ideal opportunity for Brussels not just to alleviate human right concerns before they further escalate but to improve the effectiveness of the entire EU antitrust regime.

—Mr. Riley teaches EU antitrust law at City Law School and City University and is an associate research fellow at the Center for European Policy Studies.


Green Paper on Consumer Collective Redress – Response

Green Paper on Consumer Collective Redress – Response [*]


Cum mai merge Regulamentul 1 din 2003?

UN rapsuns la problema experientelor UE din domeniul concurentei puteti gasi in Comunicarea Comisiei catre Parlament si Consiliu [COM (2009), 206 final] documentul de lucru aici.

Desigur este o obligatie de serviciu, pentru ca art. 44 din Regulamentul 1/2003 prevedea obligatia ca pana la 1 mai 2009, sa fie publicat un astfel de raport.


Comunicare a Comisiei. Recapitalizare institutii financiare & criza actuala

Comunicare a ComisieiRecapitalizarea instituțiilor financiare în contextul actualei crize financiare: limitarea ajutorului la minimul necesar și garanții împotriva denaturărilor nejustificate ale concurenței 

 [RO]

 


Comunicarea Comisiei> Abuzul de pozitie dominanta, evolutie

Abuzul de pozitie dominanta are un nou document sinteza din partea Comisiei, din data de 3 decembrie 2008. deocamdata e disponibil doar in limba engleza (aici) dar va fi publicat in JOUE.


Hawk, Article 82 and Section 2. Concurenta la europeni si americani.O comparatie.

Barry E. Hawk, Article 82 and Section 2: Abuse and Monopolizing Conduct, Issues of Competition Law and Policy, Vol. 2, p. 871, 2008; Fordham Law Legal Studies Research Paper No. 1301690. Available at SSRN 

Abstract:
Differing historical contexts, such as the greater role of public companies and state-created monopolies in the EU, differing policy considerations such as the EU’s traditional embrace of fairness, and differing underlying economic and juridical assumptions about, among others, market erosion and the capability of authorities and courts to identify and remedy anticompetitive conduct, all explain the traditionally broader scope of Article 82 compared with Section 2. However, the EU’s increasing acceptance of mainstream economics, welfare analysis and an effects-oriented inquiry, together with the declining influence of the Ordoliberals, should narrow (but not eliminate) the present gap between Section 2 and Article 82.


Ajutor de stat: Comisia/Franta, C-214/07. “Imposibilitate absolută de executare”

CJCE, Comisia/Franta, C-214/07, Hotărârea din 13 noiembrie 2008. [*]

Obiectul actiunii in neîndeplinirea obligaţiilor  Comisiei il constituie nerespectarea Deciziei 2004/343/CE a Comisiei din 16 decembrie 2003 privind schema de ajutor pusă în aplicare de Franta în privinta preluării întreprinderilor aflate în dificultate, JO L 108, p. 38. [*]

“În ceea ce priveste întreprinderile beneficiare care si au încetat activitatea, menţionate în corespondenţa referitoare la executarea deciziei, Comisia sustine că, în cazul transferului de active, trebuie să se examineze conditiile financiare ale tranzactiei pentru a se asigura că transferul a fost realizat în conformitate cu conditiile pietei.” (par. 15)
“Potrivit jurisprudentei, elementul de ajutor poate fi considerat, cu această conditie, inclus în prețul de cumpărare, astfel încât cumpărătorul nu poate, în principiu, să fie considerat beneficiar al unui avantaj (Hotărârea din 20 septembrie 2001, Banks, C 390/98, Rec., p. I 6117, punctul 77, si Hotărârea din 29 aprilie 2004, Germania/Comisia, C 277/00, Rec., p. I 3925, punctul 80), beneficiul ajutorului fiind păstrat de către cedent.” (par. 16)

“În orice caz, recuperarea ajutorului nu ar putea fi condiţionată de indicarea valorii ajutorului în actul de transfer al activelor. În caz contrar, ar fi extrem de uşor să fie repus în discuţie efectul util al normelor privind ajutoarele de stat. Ar fi suficient ca părţile la o tranzacţie efectuată la un preţ inferior preţului pieţei să omită să menţioneze în contract transferul ajutorului. Or, verificarea existenţei unui transfer al ajutorului către dobânditor nu ar putea depinde numai de voinţa părţilor la tranzacţie.” (par. 18)

 Aceasta [Republica Franceză] susţine că, atât pentru transferurile de active realizate prin cesiuni pe cale contractuală, cât si pentru cele care au intervenit în cadrul unor proceduri de redresare si de lichidare judiciară, autorităţile fiscale nu pot aprecia dacă transferurile în cauză s-au desfăsurat în condiţii normale de piaţă. [par. 35]
Într adevăr, dacă există o piaţă imobiliară, nu ar exista o piaţă a bunurilor industriale de ocazie. Asadar, pentru acestea nu este disponibilă nicio referinţă pentru determinarea unui preţ de piaţă în momentul transferului.[par. 36]

În ceea ce privește cesiunile de active pe cale contractuală realizate de întreprinderile care şi au încetat activitatea, recuperarea ajutoarelor nu ar avea niciun temei juridic în cazurile în care transferul ajutorului către dobânditor nu ar fi fost menţionat în actul de cesiune. [par. 41] 

Aprecierea Curţii

În caz de dificultăţi, Comisia si statul membru, în temeiul normei care impune statelor membre şi instituţiilor comunitare obligaţii reciproce de cooperare loială, care rezultă în special din articolul 10 CE, trebuie să colaboreze cu bună credinţă pentru depăşirea acestor dificultăţi, cu respectarea deplină a prevederilor tratatului şi în special a celor privind ajutoarele de stat (a se vedea Hotărârea din 12 mai 2005, Comisia/Grecia, C 415/03, Rec., p. I 3875, punctul 42 şi jurisprudenţa citată). [par. 45]
Condiţia unei imposibilităţi absolute de executare nu este îndeplinită atunci când statul membru pârât se limitează să comunice Comisiei dificultăţi juridice, politice sau practice pe care le prezintă punerea în aplicare a deciziei, fără a întreprinde un veritabil demers pe lângă întreprinderile în cauză pentru recuperarea ajutorului şi fără a propune Comisiei modalităţi alternative de punere în aplicare a deciziei, care să permită depăşirea dificultăţilor (a se vedea în special Hotărârea din 14 decembrie 2006, Comisia/Spania, C 485/03-C 490/03, Rec., p. I 11887, punctul 74 şi jurisprudenţa citată). [par. 46]

  În acest caz, elementul de ajutor a fost evaluat la preţul pieţei şi a fost inclus în preţul de cumpărare, astfel încât cumpărătorul nu poate fi considerat beneficiar al unui avantaj în raport cu alţi operatori de pe piaţă (Hotărârea Germania/Comisia, citată anterior, punctul 80). În caz contrar, nu poate fi exclus ca cesionarul să poată, dacă este cazul, să fie obligat la restituirea ajutoarelor în cauză, în condiţiile în care s ar stabili că păstrează beneficiul efectiv al avantajului concurenţial legat de beneficiul respectivelor ajutoare (Hotărârea Germania/Comisia, citată anterior, punctul 86). [par. 58]

Pentru verificarea condiţiilor financiare ale cesiunii, autorităţile naţionale pot lua în considerare, printre altele, forma utilizată pentru cesiune, de exemplu cea a adjudecării publice, considerată că garantează o vânzare în condiţiile pieţei. [par. 59]
De asemenea, acestea pot lua în considerare, printre altele, o eventuală expertiză desfăsurată cu ocazia cesiunii. [par. 60]
În cazul în care activele au fost preluate de mai mulţi dobânditori diferiţi, nimic nu se opune, în principiu, să fie verificată conformitatea condiţiilor financiare ale fiecăreia dintre operaţiuni cu condiţiile pieţei. [par. 61]
În ipoteza unei cesiuni de active pe cale contractuală, recuperarea ajutoarelor de la cesionar nu poate fi subordonată menţionării exprese în act a unui transfer al acestor ajutoare. Aceasta poate fi operată atunci când cesionarul trebuia să aibă cunostinţă despre existenţa ajutoarelor si despre o procedură de control desfăsurată de către Comisie. [par. 62]
Prin neexecutarea în termenul stabilit a Deciziei 2004/343/CE a Comisiei din 16 decembrie 2003 privind schema de ajutor pusă în aplicare de Franţa în privinţa preluării întreprinderilor aflate în dificultate, Republica Franceză nu si a îndeplinit obligaţiile care îi revin în temeiul articolului 5 din decizia menţionată.

Comisia se bucura: State aid: Commission welcomes Court ruling on recovery of illegal aid, 13.11.2008.


Stenuit c France

Stenuit c France

CEDO extinde garantiile conferite de art. 6 din Conventie in privinta persoanelor juridice.


Malek Radeideh, Fair Trading in EC Law

Nu am vazut cartea, dar pare a fi interesanta. un om cat o carte. si un site pentru ambii – aici.

Malek Radeideh, Fair Trading in EC Law- Information and Consumer Choice in the Internal Market, Europa Law Publishing, 2005. {euobserver, site-ul editurii, }

Cuprinsul

 

At the same time, the European Court of Justice has developed in its case law a general concept of fair trading on the basis of the EC Treaty provisions on free movement.

The author provides a systematic and comprehensive analysis of primary law as interpreted by the European Court of Justice in its relevant case law and of Community legislation pertaining to fair trading. He demonstrates that the countless specific fair trading rules are based on a common general concept of fair trading. The author thus unveils a principle of fair trading in the acquis communautaire, which he defines not only in content but also in scope, proving it to be a general principle of Internal Market law. The interrelationship between fair trading and the functioning of the Internal Market is one of the central themes of the book, which, unlike other fair trading related analyses, attaches particular weight to the role of primary law.

Finally, in the light of the previous findings a stand is taken on the current initiative to adopt a directive on unfair commercial practices, which is the latest manifestation of the recurring idea of horizontal harmonisation in this field.

Dr. Malek Radeideh (1973) studied law at Universität Bielefeld, Université Robert Schuman Strasbourg and Freie Universität Berlin. He obtained his German law degree in 2000. From 2001 to 2004 he worked as a researcher at the Department of European and Economic Law at the Rijksuniversiteit Groningen. In his research he focussed on EC fair trading law, which he understands as a synthesis of European consumer law, European private law, and, above all, Internal Market law. He has participated in various legal studies for the European Commission and has published in his field of research. In 2004 he returned to Berlin in order to work in legal practice.


Dalai Lama ar vrea ca sediul Comisiei sa fie mutat in Polonia

Desi stirea a propus reactii stravezii, am observat ca omul a fost in Polonia (cetatean de onoare al Wroclaw-ului) si chiar a comparat Polonia cu Tibetul. {la o cautare google in ro…si in engleza}

Cu aceasta ocazie, colateral, propun ca macar o Agentie a Uniunii sa se mute la noi in tara sau sa se infiinteze una noua ca si asa e hemoragie de agentii.


Volkswagen poate fi achizitionat de Porsche. Nu se concentreaza piata

Concentrations: la Commission autorise le projet de rachat de Volkswagen par Porsche, Bruxelles, le 23 juillet 2008, IP/08/1201 [EN, FR]

La Commission européenne a autorisé, en vertu du règlement CE sur les concentrations, le projet de rachat de Volkswagen Allemagne par la société allemande Porsche. Après avoir examiné l’opération, elle a conclu que l’opération n’entraverait pas de manière significative l’exercice d’une concurrence effective dans l’Espace économique européen (EEE) ou une partie substantielle de celui-ci.


Favorizarea excesiva a consumatorilor?

Articolul este fara indoiala interesant.

Dino Falaschetti, CAN LOBBYING PREVENT ANTICOMPETITIVE OUTCOMES? EVIDENCE ON CONSUMER MONOPSONY IN TELECOMMUNICATIONS, Journal of Competition Law and Economics Advance Access published online on June 4, 2008 [*]

When basic competition rules cannot stop market power abuses, industry-specific regulations can improve economic performance. But regulations are also more immediately exposed to political pressures than are judicially administered antitrust laws, and this exposure can cause regulations to serve distributional rather than efficiency goals. Instead of supporting a Chicago School hypothesis where distributional forces tend to favor producers, however, I find evidence that regulations can inefficiently expand consumer surplus when producers lack a political voice. In particular, local exchange carriers maintain significantly smaller capital stocks in states that restrict campaign contributions from regulated utilities. This relationship is difficult to rationalize as either a statistical artifact or evidence that campaign finance laws discourage producers from restraining trade. Indeed, rather than endowing producers with political currency to capture regulators, allowances for campaign contributions appear to have strengthened competition by discouraging regulatory takings and balancing monopsonistic pressures from consumer-voters. These results highlight an empirically important potential for regulations to favor consumers overly, and strengthen arguments against consumer surplus as an objective for competition policies.


OMV & Moll sau despre o lupta “austro-ungara” pe taramul unei oferte publice de cumparare

Din The Independent, caruia ii apartine sintagma:

Now what becomes of the open market?

An Austro-Hungarian takeover battle is testing the EU’s policies on competition and protectionism. Mark Leftly reports from Brussels

Sunday, 1 June 2008

 

A $20bn hostile take-over involving oil and gas majors from Austria and Hungary is threatening to wreck the European Union’s open-market ideal. This is a bitterly contested plan that has angered leading figures in the European Parliament and European Commission, and divided senior energy bankers in the City of London. And from this month, EU officials will begin a dispute-resolution process that will take at least two years.

 

OMV of Austria has been chasing Hungarian peer Mol since September last year. The Austrians, advised by JPMorgan and Deutsche, told Mol they might be willing to splash out 32,000 huf (the Hungarian currency) a share. That is a 50 per cent premium and values a takeover around the $20bn (£10bn) mark. Mol has fiercely contested the proposal on the basis that it would create a monopoly in central Europe. The Hungarians’ defence team comprises UBS, Goldman Sachs and Morgan Stanley.

What has most angered the European Parliament and Commission is the intervention of the Hungarian government. Less than a month after OMV announced its takeover intentions, the Hungarian parliament passed what has been nicknamed the “Lex-Mol Bill”, which protects strategic companies. There are fears that geo-politics is trumping economics, with the Hungarians retreating to protectionism – or at least protection from the Austrians, given the turbulent history between the two nations.

Peter Skinner MEP, a member of the Economic and Monetary Affairs Committee for the past 13 years, thunders: “This is not a good step. The Hungarian authorities are wrong to do this and they shouldn’t have allowed it to happen. This also throws light on concerns that the EU is not as open as its supporters say.”

A walk around Budapest shows just how important the oil and gas company is to the Hungarians. The city is filled with signs for Mol petrol stations, much as BP dominates parts of the UK market. A source close to Mol points out that the company never asked for Lex-Mol – that it was a government decision. However, the source argues that OMV is mischief making, citing German Chancellor Angela Merkel as just one senior EU figure who has called for curbs on takeovers of major national companies.

“It’s very convenient of OMV to throw in the EU equality issue,” says the source. “But this is not an unusual type of stance for an EU country to take.”

It seems that the European Commission does not agree. The Independent on Sunday understands that Charlie McCreevy, the Internal Market and Services Commissioner, has decided to challenge the Hungarian government over Lex-Mol. Already his department has sent a letter to the government explaining that it is examining the issue, and has received a response.

Although Mr McCreevy’s spokesman says the commission will not make a formal decision on its next move until a “later meeting” – believed to be the end of this month – a source says this will simply rubber-stamp the views of legal experts in Brussels. “The opinion there is that this is in contravention of EU law,” the source explains.

Should the commission formalise this decision, Hungary will have another chance to respond, and after that the case could be taken to the European Court of Justice. So this already drawn-out process could go on another two years before the court makes a judgment.

More immediately, a second EU probe of the takeover resumed late last week. At the start of May, Competition Commissioner Neelie Kroes suspended her investigation after just two months, arguing that she had not received all the information needed to proceed. It is understood OMV has since sent in more detailed documents on petrol stations. This is one of the areas where OMV and Mol’s activities are most likely to overlap, so causing monopoly issues.

Sources close to OMV confirm that the company would be willing to sell off a percentage of the petrol stations, as well as at least a share of one of the combined entity’s power plants. “OMV has now submitted all the information the commission required,” says one source. “The clock has been turned back on.”

As a result of the probe, Ms Kroes will detail the market impact of a merger, and the Mol team hope this will prove that the deal would create major monopolies. They are also optimistic that any solutions to this, such as asset sales, will be counter- productive for the predator. A Mol backer says: “The refining capacity synergies are at the heart of the value of the deal. Being forced to sell those assets would undermine what OMV is trying to achieve.”

A final issue is the challenge that OMV is taking to the Hungarian courts over Mol’s annual general meeting in April. OMV was already angered that its 20.2 per cent stake in Mol gave it only 10 per cent of the votes under company rules; now the Austrians want resolutions at the AGM overturned. OMV argues that “friendly” shareholders – those that have about 40 per cent of shares formerly held by Mol, such as Czech power group CEZ – were directed to vote on several key issues with management. Among those resolutions was an increase in the limit on shares that Mol could buy back from the market, so making any hostile takeover more tricky.

A Mol adviser says the shares were sold or loaned to these shareholders on an “arm’s-length basis”, meaning they could vote as they wished. Also, complaints that some of OMV’s key shareholder allies were not even allowed into the meeting have been dismissed on the grounds that they had several months to produce the documentation that would have let them vote.

It is not clear which side will win this long fight. One industry figure expresses the hopes of many in Brussels when he says that the dominant argument driving the saga’s fate should be over market concerns rather than geo-political ones. “Ultimately, if there is a compelling price on the table and monopolies are avoided, shareholders [in both companies] should end up winning the day.”


Controlul fuziunilor. Un fel de enciclopedie

Aceasta editie supliment, pe langa editia inaugurala a seriei, adauga si aduce la zi legislatia din mai mlte state dar si cea din Uniunea Europeana.

Editia inaugurala: Maher Dabbah, Paul Lasok (General editor), Merger Control Worldwide 3 Volume Set, Cambridge University Press, 2008  [*] Capitolul referitor la Romania ii apartine lui Gelu Goran.

Editia supliment: Maher Dabbah, Paul Lasok (General editor), Merger Control Worldwide. Second Supplement to the First Edition, Cambridge University Press, 2008 [*] De la p. 41 la 45 cartea se refera si la Uniunea Europeana. O sinteza e o sinteza.


Actiune in revendicare pentru nume de domeniu

O interesanta constructie juridica.

Christine Kelly récupère son nom de domaine grâce à une requête en revendication, LEGALIS.NET, 15.05.2008

La journaliste de LCI, Christine Kelly, a utilisé une procédure peu commune pour récupérer un nom de domaine: la requête en revendication fondée sur l’article L 624-9 du code de commerce. Celle-ci s’inscrit dans le cadre d’une liquidation judiciaire. En effet, lors de l’ouverture d’une procédure collective, les détenteurs de biens mobiliers (équipements, fonds de commerce, logiciels, etc.) ont la possibilité de revendiquer leur propriété dans des conditions précises de forme et de délai, faute de quoi ces biens tombent dans l’actif de la société en liquidation.
Dans cette affaire, la société Kapado qui avait enregistré christine-kelly.fr en son nom alors qu’elle devait le faire pour le compte de la présentatrice a justement été mise en liquidation judiciaire. Avant la procédure collective, la journaliste avait pourtant entrepris des démarches pour récupérer son identité sur internet. Mais Kapado, qui a reconnu avoir commis une erreur, n’avait pas montré une ferme volonté de la corriger. Face à son inertie et sa négligence, Christine Kelly l’a mise en demeure de remplir un formulaire Afnic pour un transfert volontaire du nom de domaine. Kapado s’est engagée à le faire mais le transfert n’a pas été opéré. Les pourparlers se poursuivent cependant jusqu’au moment où la présentatrice découvre que la société qui détient son nom de domaine est en liquidation judiciaire. Comme le liquidateur refuse d’autoriser le transfert, Christine Kelly se tourne vers le juge.
Dans une décision du 4 avril 2008, le tribunal de commerce de Pontoise a ordonné le transfert du nom de domaine christine-kelly.fr à la présentatrice dont il juge la revendication bien fondée. Selon le tribunal consulaire, «seule Christine Kelly peut être propriétaire du nom de domaine christine-kelly.fr, dont elle revendique la propriété».

(*)


Si Simfonia a IX era neterminata? Despre dreptul concurentei in UE

Jürgen Basedow, The Modernization of European Competition Law: A Story of Unfinished Concept, Texas International Law Journal. Austin: Summer 2007. Vol. 42, Iss. 3. [*]

Summary

I. Decentralization

II. A More Economic Approach in Merger Control

III. Private Enforcement

 


Comunicarea Comisiei – controlul concentrarilor economice, 2008

Comunicare jurisdicţională consolidată a Comisiei în temeiul Regulamentului (CE) nr. 139/2004 al Consiliului privind controlul concentrărilor economice între întreprinderi [*]


European Competition Law Review [*, *]
Volume 29, Issue 4, 2008

Massimo Motta, On Cartel Deterrence and Fines in the European Union, European Competition Law Review, Volume 29, Issue 4, 2008

This paper assesses-with the help of some simple quantitative analysis-the European Commission’s practice against cartels, with particular reference to fines. It then discusses policies which can be used to increase cartel deterrence.

Alex Petrasincu, The European Commission’s New Guidelines on the Assessment of Non-Horizontal Mergers-Great Expectations Disappointed, European Competition Law Review, Volume 29, Issue 4, 2008

The European Commission recently published its Guidelines on the assessment of non-horizontal mergers. This article examines the Guidelines’ approach to non-horizontal mergers by comparing it to the Commission’s enforcement practice. At first glance, the Guidelines seem to describe the analysis of vertical and conglomerate mergers in a rather comprehensive manner. An in-depth examination however reveals that the Guidelines raise many questions.

Tjarda Van Der Vijver, Exemptions to Third Party Access for New Infrastructures in the European Community Gas Sector-The Exception that Defies the Rule?, European Competition Law Review, Volume 29, Issue 4, 2008

In order to stimulate competition in the European gas sector, the Second Gas Directive puts forward the principle of third party access (TPA). Exemptions to TPA can be made if these are necessary to built new infrastructures. This article examines how the national authorities deal with such exemptions. It concludes that exemptions are more easily granted than the underlying texts suggest, but that there are understandable reasons for this.

Hanna Anttilainen-Mochnacz, Two-step Transaction Structures in the Context of the EC Merger Regulation: To Have or to Hold?, European Competition Law Review, Volume 29, Issue 4, 2008

Two-step transaction structures such as “pooling”, “warehousing” and options may solve commercial needs but face increasing hurdles in the context of the EC merger control rules. This article considers the various interpretation problems raised by such structures as well as considering some pertinent past case law.

John F. Blakney, Olivia Wright, The North American Price Discrimination Law Debate: Considerations for Europe, European Competition Law Review, Volume 29, Issue 4, 2008

This article looks to Canadian competition law to argue the merits of a tailored price discrimination prohibition of demonstrably anti-competitive conduct for European competition law, particularly in the buyer side or upstream markets where market power can arise at market shares well below those generally applied for general abuse of dominance and anti-monopolization prohibitions.
Moritz Lorenz, The New Chinese Competition Act, European Competition Law Review, Volume 29, Issue 4, 2008

On August 30, 2007, China passed its first complete competition law following over 10 years of debate. The new act comes into force on August 1, 2008. China will then have a law which contains the “classic three pillars of competition law”, specifically a prohibition on anti-competitive agreements and a prohibition on abuse of dominance and merger control. Until now these areas were only covered by very fragmented regulations. In addition, the new act contains a prohibition on the abuse of sovereign power to reduce or eliminate competition. With the new legislation the People’s Republic of China has achieved another step on the road to transforming itself from a planned to a free market economy, and the new law markedly changes the legal framework for the activities of foreign companies. The following article provides an overview of the changes and in so doing draws comparisons with the EC regime.

David Wirth, Niall Collins, Assessing the Cost-Benefit Impact within the De Minimis Exception, European Competition Law Review, Volume 29, Issue 4, 2008

This article provides an overview of the Office of Fair Trading’s “New Guidelines”, published in November 2007 and revising their de minimis guidance. It assesses how this guidance has been applied in recent public transport merger decisions, and calls attention to factors potentially relevant to mergers in other sectors.

Case Comment
Gerard Rothschild, The Battle of the Buses: Chester City Council v Arriva Plc, European Competition Law Review, Volume 29, Issue 4, 2008

This article analyses the English High Court’s decision in Chester City Council v Arriva Plc. The expedited claim under s.18 of the Competition Act 1998 alleged abuse of dominance by predatory action influencing the sale of a municipal bus company. The article considers market analysis, standard of proof and approach to expert evidence in such a claim.

Book Reviews

Stephen Tupper, Regulating Utilities and Promoting Competition-Lessons for the Future; Utility Regulation in Competitive Markets-Problems and Progress, European Competition Law Review, Volume 29, Issue 4, 2008

 


Fuziune si concurenta

Lucian Bebchuk and Allen Ferrell, “On Takeover Law and Regulatory Competition” (March 11, 2002). Harvard Law School. Harvard Law School John M. Olin Center for Law, Economics and Business Discussion Paper Series. Paper 363.

This paper defends, and further develops, our earlier work on the effects of regulatory competition on takeover law. We have argued that competition for corporate charters provides incentives to states to protect incumbent managers from hostile takeovers, and that the empirical evidence is consistent with this account. To improve the performance of regulatory competition, we have put forward the possibility of choice-enhancing federal intervention; such intervention would expand shareholder choice, and encourage states to become more attentive to shareholder interests, with out imposing any mandatory arrangements. Replying to Jonathan Macey’s response to our work, we show that none of his claims weaken our analysis.


Antitrustul poate fi juridic?

Desigur am pus doar o intrebare, dar se vede ca nu trebuie justificari pentru exclude juristii din dreptul concurentei. A se vedea si celebrele decizii ale CJCE si TPI care au un caracter semi-politic-economic-ideologic.
Astept sa ma corectati.
LAWRENCE J. WHITE, The Growing Influence of Economics and Economists on Antitrust: An Extended Discussion, (January 24, 2008). New York University School of Law. New York University Law and Economics Working Papers. Paper 119.

Over the past two to three decades economics has played an increasingly important role in the development of U.S. antitrust enforcement and policy. This essay first reviews the major facets of U.S. antitrust enforcement and next reviews the ways in which economics — starting from a low base — has grown in importance in antitrust. The essay then highlights three antitrust areas in which the influence of economics has had the greatest influence: merger analysis, vertical relationships, and predatory pricing. The essay concludes with the identification of four antitrust areas where further economics analysis could have high returns.


Criterii pentru o intelegere (antanta) indirecta

Critères de l’entente indirecte
Cass. com., 9 oct. 2007, pourvoi n° 06-12.446.
Cass. com., 9 oct. 2007, pourvoi n° 06-12.596.

La Cour de cassation vient de se prononcer sur les critères de participation d’une entreprise à une entente globale, impliquant d’autres entreprises que celles avec lesquelles elle s’est directement concertée.

La Cour d’appel de Paris avait retenu la participation de la société Connex, devenue Véolia Transport, dans une entente à trois avec les sociétés Kéolis et Transdev, en relevant que la société Kéolis servait de pivot naturel à l’entente et jouait un rôle d’interface destinée à coordonner une stratégie d’ensemble.

La Cour de cassation a cassé l’arrêt sur ce point en rappelant les critères retenus par la jurisprudence de la Cour de justice des Communautés européennes (CJCE, 8 juill. 1999, Anic, aff. C-49/92 P ; CJCE, 7 janv. 2004, Aalborg Portland, aff. C-204/00 P) pour caractériser une telle entente tripartite.

Selon la jurisprudence européenne, il convient de démontrer que l’entreprise en cause a entendu contribuer par son propre comportement aux objectifs communs poursuivis par l’ensemble des participants et qu’elle avait connaissance des comportements matériels envisagés ou mis en œuvre par ces autres participants, ou pouvait raisonnablement les prévoir.

C’est faute d’avoir caractérisé ces éléments que l’arrêt de la Cour d’appel a été censuré.

Sursa.


Pagina Următoare »

    Domnia cantitatii & semnele vremurilor

    • 111,217 uitaturi pe blog