Favorizarea excesiva a consumatorilor?

Articolul este fara indoiala interesant.

Dino Falaschetti, CAN LOBBYING PREVENT ANTICOMPETITIVE OUTCOMES? EVIDENCE ON CONSUMER MONOPSONY IN TELECOMMUNICATIONS, Journal of Competition Law and Economics Advance Access published online on June 4, 2008 [*]

When basic competition rules cannot stop market power abuses, industry-specific regulations can improve economic performance. But regulations are also more immediately exposed to political pressures than are judicially administered antitrust laws, and this exposure can cause regulations to serve distributional rather than efficiency goals. Instead of supporting a Chicago School hypothesis where distributional forces tend to favor producers, however, I find evidence that regulations can inefficiently expand consumer surplus when producers lack a political voice. In particular, local exchange carriers maintain significantly smaller capital stocks in states that restrict campaign contributions from regulated utilities. This relationship is difficult to rationalize as either a statistical artifact or evidence that campaign finance laws discourage producers from restraining trade. Indeed, rather than endowing producers with political currency to capture regulators, allowances for campaign contributions appear to have strengthened competition by discouraging regulatory takings and balancing monopsonistic pressures from consumer-voters. These results highlight an empirically important potential for regulations to favor consumers overly, and strengthen arguments against consumer surplus as an objective for competition policies.

OMV & Moll sau despre o lupta “austro-ungara” pe taramul unei oferte publice de cumparare

Din The Independent, caruia ii apartine sintagma:

Now what becomes of the open market?

An Austro-Hungarian takeover battle is testing the EU’s policies on competition and protectionism. Mark Leftly reports from Brussels

 

A $20bn hostile take-over involving oil and gas majors from Austria and Hungary is threatening to wreck the European Union’s open-market ideal. This is a bitterly contested plan that has angered leading figures in the European Parliament and European Commission, and divided senior energy bankers in the City of London. And from this month, EU officials will begin a dispute-resolution process that will take at least two years.

 

OMV of Austria has been chasing Hungarian peer Mol since September last year. The Austrians, advised by JPMorgan and Deutsche, told Mol they might be willing to splash out 32,000 huf (the Hungarian currency) a share. That is a 50 per cent premium and values a takeover around the $20bn (£10bn) mark. Mol has fiercely contested the proposal on the basis that it would create a monopoly in central Europe. The Hungarians’ defence team comprises UBS, Goldman Sachs and Morgan Stanley.

What has most angered the European Parliament and Commission is the intervention of the Hungarian government. Less than a month after OMV announced its takeover intentions, the Hungarian parliament passed what has been nicknamed the “Lex-Mol Bill”, which protects strategic companies. There are fears that geo-politics is trumping economics, with the Hungarians retreating to protectionism – or at least protection from the Austrians, given the turbulent history between the two nations.

Peter Skinner MEP, a member of the Economic and Monetary Affairs Committee for the past 13 years, thunders: “This is not a good step. The Hungarian authorities are wrong to do this and they shouldn’t have allowed it to happen. This also throws light on concerns that the EU is not as open as its supporters say.”

A walk around Budapest shows just how important the oil and gas company is to the Hungarians. The city is filled with signs for Mol petrol stations, much as BP dominates parts of the UK market. A source close to Mol points out that the company never asked for Lex-Mol – that it was a government decision. However, the source argues that OMV is mischief making, citing German Chancellor Angela Merkel as just one senior EU figure who has called for curbs on takeovers of major national companies.

“It’s very convenient of OMV to throw in the EU equality issue,” says the source. “But this is not an unusual type of stance for an EU country to take.”

It seems that the European Commission does not agree. The Independent on Sunday understands that Charlie McCreevy, the Internal Market and Services Commissioner, has decided to challenge the Hungarian government over Lex-Mol. Already his department has sent a letter to the government explaining that it is examining the issue, and has received a response.

Although Mr McCreevy’s spokesman says the commission will not make a formal decision on its next move until a “later meeting” – believed to be the end of this month – a source says this will simply rubber-stamp the views of legal experts in Brussels. “The opinion there is that this is in contravention of EU law,” the source explains.

Should the commission formalise this decision, Hungary will have another chance to respond, and after that the case could be taken to the European Court of Justice. So this already drawn-out process could go on another two years before the court makes a judgment.

More immediately, a second EU probe of the takeover resumed late last week. At the start of May, Competition Commissioner Neelie Kroes suspended her investigation after just two months, arguing that she had not received all the information needed to proceed. It is understood OMV has since sent in more detailed documents on petrol stations. This is one of the areas where OMV and Mol’s activities are most likely to overlap, so causing monopoly issues.

Sources close to OMV confirm that the company would be willing to sell off a percentage of the petrol stations, as well as at least a share of one of the combined entity’s power plants. “OMV has now submitted all the information the commission required,” says one source. “The clock has been turned back on.”

As a result of the probe, Ms Kroes will detail the market impact of a merger, and the Mol team hope this will prove that the deal would create major monopolies. They are also optimistic that any solutions to this, such as asset sales, will be counter- productive for the predator. A Mol backer says: “The refining capacity synergies are at the heart of the value of the deal. Being forced to sell those assets would undermine what OMV is trying to achieve.”

A final issue is the challenge that OMV is taking to the Hungarian courts over Mol’s annual general meeting in April. OMV was already angered that its 20.2 per cent stake in Mol gave it only 10 per cent of the votes under company rules; now the Austrians want resolutions at the AGM overturned. OMV argues that “friendly” shareholders – those that have about 40 per cent of shares formerly held by Mol, such as Czech power group CEZ – were directed to vote on several key issues with management. Among those resolutions was an increase in the limit on shares that Mol could buy back from the market, so making any hostile takeover more tricky.

A Mol adviser says the shares were sold or loaned to these shareholders on an “arm’s-length basis”, meaning they could vote as they wished. Also, complaints that some of OMV’s key shareholder allies were not even allowed into the meeting have been dismissed on the grounds that they had several months to produce the documentation that would have let them vote.

It is not clear which side will win this long fight. One industry figure expresses the hopes of many in Brussels when he says that the dominant argument driving the saga’s fate should be over market concerns rather than geo-political ones. “Ultimately, if there is a compelling price on the table and monopolies are avoided, shareholders [in both companies] should end up winning the day.”

Controlul fuziunilor. Un fel de enciclopedie

Aceasta editie supliment, pe langa editia inaugurala a seriei, adauga si aduce la zi legislatia din mai mlte state dar si cea din Uniunea Europeana.

Editia inaugurala: Maher Dabbah, Paul Lasok (General editor), Merger Control Worldwide 3 Volume Set, Cambridge University Press, 2008  [*] Capitolul referitor la Romania ii apartine lui Gelu Goran.

Editia supliment: Maher Dabbah, Paul Lasok (General editor), Merger Control Worldwide. Second Supplement to the First Edition, Cambridge University Press, 2008 [*] De la p. 41 la 45 cartea se refera si la Uniunea Europeana. O sinteza e o sinteza.

Actiune in revendicare pentru nume de domeniu

O interesanta constructie juridica.

Christine Kelly récupère son nom de domaine grâce à une requête en revendication, LEGALIS.NET, 15.05.2008

La journaliste de LCI, Christine Kelly, a utilisé une procédure peu commune pour récupérer un nom de domaine: la requête en revendication fondée sur l’article L 624-9 du code de commerce. Celle-ci s’inscrit dans le cadre d’une liquidation judiciaire. En effet, lors de l’ouverture d’une procédure collective, les détenteurs de biens mobiliers (équipements, fonds de commerce, logiciels, etc.) ont la possibilité de revendiquer leur propriété dans des conditions précises de forme et de délai, faute de quoi ces biens tombent dans l’actif de la société en liquidation.
Dans cette affaire, la société Kapado qui avait enregistré christine-kelly.fr en son nom alors qu’elle devait le faire pour le compte de la présentatrice a justement été mise en liquidation judiciaire. Avant la procédure collective, la journaliste avait pourtant entrepris des démarches pour récupérer son identité sur internet. Mais Kapado, qui a reconnu avoir commis une erreur, n’avait pas montré une ferme volonté de la corriger. Face à son inertie et sa négligence, Christine Kelly l’a mise en demeure de remplir un formulaire Afnic pour un transfert volontaire du nom de domaine. Kapado s’est engagée à le faire mais le transfert n’a pas été opéré. Les pourparlers se poursuivent cependant jusqu’au moment où la présentatrice découvre que la société qui détient son nom de domaine est en liquidation judiciaire. Comme le liquidateur refuse d’autoriser le transfert, Christine Kelly se tourne vers le juge.
Dans une décision du 4 avril 2008, le tribunal de commerce de Pontoise a ordonné le transfert du nom de domaine christine-kelly.fr à la présentatrice dont il juge la revendication bien fondée. Selon le tribunal consulaire, «seule Christine Kelly peut être propriétaire du nom de domaine christine-kelly.fr, dont elle revendique la propriété».

(*)

Si Simfonia a IX era neterminata? Despre dreptul concurentei in UE

Jürgen Basedow, The Modernization of European Competition Law: A Story of Unfinished Concept, Texas International Law Journal. Austin: Summer 2007. Vol. 42, Iss. 3. [*]

Summary

I. Decentralization

II. A More Economic Approach in Merger Control

III. Private Enforcement

 

Comunicarea Comisiei - controlul concentrarilor economice, 2008

Comunicare jurisdicţională consolidată a Comisiei în temeiul Regulamentului (CE) nr. 139/2004 al Consiliului privind controlul concentrărilor economice între întreprinderi [*]

European Competition Law Review [*, *]
Volume 29, Issue 4, 2008

Massimo Motta, On Cartel Deterrence and Fines in the European Union, European Competition Law Review, Volume 29, Issue 4, 2008

This paper assesses-with the help of some simple quantitative analysis-the European Commission’s practice against cartels, with particular reference to fines. It then discusses policies which can be used to increase cartel deterrence.

Alex Petrasincu, The European Commission’s New Guidelines on the Assessment of Non-Horizontal Mergers-Great Expectations Disappointed, European Competition Law Review, Volume 29, Issue 4, 2008

The European Commission recently published its Guidelines on the assessment of non-horizontal mergers. This article examines the Guidelines’ approach to non-horizontal mergers by comparing it to the Commission’s enforcement practice. At first glance, the Guidelines seem to describe the analysis of vertical and conglomerate mergers in a rather comprehensive manner. An in-depth examination however reveals that the Guidelines raise many questions.

Tjarda Van Der Vijver, Exemptions to Third Party Access for New Infrastructures in the European Community Gas Sector-The Exception that Defies the Rule?, European Competition Law Review, Volume 29, Issue 4, 2008

In order to stimulate competition in the European gas sector, the Second Gas Directive puts forward the principle of third party access (TPA). Exemptions to TPA can be made if these are necessary to built new infrastructures. This article examines how the national authorities deal with such exemptions. It concludes that exemptions are more easily granted than the underlying texts suggest, but that there are understandable reasons for this.

Hanna Anttilainen-Mochnacz, Two-step Transaction Structures in the Context of the EC Merger Regulation: To Have or to Hold?, European Competition Law Review, Volume 29, Issue 4, 2008

Two-step transaction structures such as “pooling”, “warehousing” and options may solve commercial needs but face increasing hurdles in the context of the EC merger control rules. This article considers the various interpretation problems raised by such structures as well as considering some pertinent past case law.

John F. Blakney, Olivia Wright, The North American Price Discrimination Law Debate: Considerations for Europe, European Competition Law Review, Volume 29, Issue 4, 2008

This article looks to Canadian competition law to argue the merits of a tailored price discrimination prohibition of demonstrably anti-competitive conduct for European competition law, particularly in the buyer side or upstream markets where market power can arise at market shares well below those generally applied for general abuse of dominance and anti-monopolization prohibitions.
Moritz Lorenz, The New Chinese Competition Act, European Competition Law Review, Volume 29, Issue 4, 2008

On August 30, 2007, China passed its first complete competition law following over 10 years of debate. The new act comes into force on August 1, 2008. China will then have a law which contains the “classic three pillars of competition law”, specifically a prohibition on anti-competitive agreements and a prohibition on abuse of dominance and merger control. Until now these areas were only covered by very fragmented regulations. In addition, the new act contains a prohibition on the abuse of sovereign power to reduce or eliminate competition. With the new legislation the People’s Republic of China has achieved another step on the road to transforming itself from a planned to a free market economy, and the new law markedly changes the legal framework for the activities of foreign companies. The following article provides an overview of the changes and in so doing draws comparisons with the EC regime.

David Wirth, Niall Collins, Assessing the Cost-Benefit Impact within the De Minimis Exception, European Competition Law Review, Volume 29, Issue 4, 2008

This article provides an overview of the Office of Fair Trading’s “New Guidelines”, published in November 2007 and revising their de minimis guidance. It assesses how this guidance has been applied in recent public transport merger decisions, and calls attention to factors potentially relevant to mergers in other sectors.

Case Comment
Gerard Rothschild, The Battle of the Buses: Chester City Council v Arriva Plc, European Competition Law Review, Volume 29, Issue 4, 2008

This article analyses the English High Court’s decision in Chester City Council v Arriva Plc. The expedited claim under s.18 of the Competition Act 1998 alleged abuse of dominance by predatory action influencing the sale of a municipal bus company. The article considers market analysis, standard of proof and approach to expert evidence in such a claim.

Book Reviews

Stephen Tupper, Regulating Utilities and Promoting Competition-Lessons for the Future; Utility Regulation in Competitive Markets-Problems and Progress, European Competition Law Review, Volume 29, Issue 4, 2008

 

Fuziune si concurenta

Lucian Bebchuk and Allen Ferrell, “On Takeover Law and Regulatory Competition” (March 11, 2002). Harvard Law School. Harvard Law School John M. Olin Center for Law, Economics and Business Discussion Paper Series. Paper 363.

This paper defends, and further develops, our earlier work on the effects of regulatory competition on takeover law. We have argued that competition for corporate charters provides incentives to states to protect incumbent managers from hostile takeovers, and that the empirical evidence is consistent with this account. To improve the performance of regulatory competition, we have put forward the possibility of choice-enhancing federal intervention; such intervention would expand shareholder choice, and encourage states to become more attentive to shareholder interests, with out imposing any mandatory arrangements. Replying to Jonathan Macey’s response to our work, we show that none of his claims weaken our analysis.

Antitrustul poate fi juridic?

Desigur am pus doar o intrebare, dar se vede ca nu trebuie justificari pentru exclude juristii din dreptul concurentei. A se vedea si celebrele decizii ale CJCE si TPI care au un caracter semi-politic-economic-ideologic.

Astept sa ma corectati.

LAWRENCE J. WHITE, The Growing Influence of Economics and Economists on Antitrust: An Extended Discussion, (January 24, 2008). New York University School of Law. New York University Law and Economics Working Papers. Paper 119.

Over the past two to three decades economics has played an increasingly important role in the development of U.S. antitrust enforcement and policy. This essay first reviews the major facets of U.S. antitrust enforcement and next reviews the ways in which economics — starting from a low base — has grown in importance in antitrust. The essay then highlights three antitrust areas in which the influence of economics has had the greatest influence: merger analysis, vertical relationships, and predatory pricing. The essay concludes with the identification of four antitrust areas where further economics analysis could have high returns.

Criterii pentru o intelegere (antanta) indirecta

Critères de l’entente indirecte
Cass. com., 9 oct. 2007, pourvoi n° 06-12.446.
Cass. com., 9 oct. 2007, pourvoi n° 06-12.596.

La Cour de cassation vient de se prononcer sur les critères de participation d’une entreprise à une entente globale, impliquant d’autres entreprises que celles avec lesquelles elle s’est directement concertée.

La Cour d’appel de Paris avait retenu la participation de la société Connex, devenue Véolia Transport, dans une entente à trois avec les sociétés Kéolis et Transdev, en relevant que la société Kéolis servait de pivot naturel à l’entente et jouait un rôle d’interface destinée à coordonner une stratégie d’ensemble.

La Cour de cassation a cassé l’arrêt sur ce point en rappelant les critères retenus par la jurisprudence de la Cour de justice des Communautés européennes (CJCE, 8 juill. 1999, Anic, aff. C-49/92 P ; CJCE, 7 janv. 2004, Aalborg Portland, aff. C-204/00 P) pour caractériser une telle entente tripartite.

Selon la jurisprudence européenne, il convient de démontrer que l’entreprise en cause a entendu contribuer par son propre comportement aux objectifs communs poursuivis par l’ensemble des participants et qu’elle avait connaissance des comportements matériels envisagés ou mis en œuvre par ces autres participants, ou pouvait raisonnablement les prévoir.

C’est faute d’avoir caractérisé ces éléments que l’arrêt de la Cour d’appel a été censuré.

Sursa.

The Challenges of Economic Proof in a Decentralized and Privatized European Competition Policy System: LESSONS FROM THE AMERICAN EXPERIENCE
Andrew I. Gavil

Since the announcement in late 2002 of the Modernization Plan, and continuing in 2005 with the release of the Green Paper on damages actions, the European Commission has been committed to a significant restructuring of the EU’s approach to enforcing competition laws. Under the revised system as envisioned by the Commission, national competition authorities and private parties will assume a far greater role in supplementing the work of the Commission, which for 50 years has been the predominant competition policy enforcer in Europe. The goal is not only to produce a system of shared enforcement authority, but to promote the continued evolution in Europe of a “culture of competition,” while avoiding the creation of a “culture of litigation.” If national competition authorities and private parties accept this invitation, however, they are likely to face the same kinds of demands for substantial economic evidence from their national courts that the EC has faced from the Court of First Instance and the European Court of Justice in some of its most complex and challenging recent cases. This paper asks whether national level enforcers, public and private, will have the procedural and evidentiary tools necessary to respond to demands for such economic proof. Drawing on the Commission’s recent experiences, as well as lessons from the U.S. experience, it asks whether the Green Paper’s treatment of economic evidence is adequate given the importance that economic proof plays today in competition law cases. It then urges the Commission to devote additional attention to identifying and advocating reforms that will more actively facilitate the disclosure, development, and presentation of economic evidence. This paper particularly questions the Green Paper’s preference for the use of court-appointed experts in lieu of party-secured expert witnesses. It argues that party and court-appointed experts can perform very different functions in competition law cases and should not be viewed as substitutes. Moreover, it suggests that the Green Paper may significantly underestimate the degree to which party-secured expert economic witnesses will be necessary if national level enforcers-public and private-are to be adequately equipped to meet the burdens of proof they will face. If national enforcers systematically find that they lack the procedural tools necessary to develop the economic evidence they need to meet those burdens, they will reduce or abandon their efforts to initiate competition law actions and it will be less likely that the promise of decentralization and privatization can be realized.

* Professor of Law, Howard University School of Law, Washington, DC. This paper is based on remarks delivered at the symposium on Forensic Economics in Competition Law Enforcement, sponsored by the Amsterdam Center for Law and Economics and held at the University of Amsterdam on March 17, 2006.

Journal of Competition Law and Economics Advance Access published online on October 22, 2007.

Concurenta neloiala in materia marcilor

Interprétation de la directive n° 89/104 : il appartient au juge national de vérifier si l’usage de la marque porte atteinte à ses fonctions essentielles

Par un arrêt rendu le 11 septembre 2007, la CJCE, saisi sur renvoi préjudiciel par la cour d’appel de Nancy de l’interprétation de la notion d’usage d’une marque au regard de la directive communautaire n° 89/104/CEE du 21 décembre 1988 (JO 1989, L 40, p. 1), rappelle sa jurisprudence selon laquelle, il y a « usage des produits » lorsqu’un tiers appose le signe constituant sa dénomination sociale, son nom commercial ou son enseigne sur les produits qu’il commercialise. À la lecture combinée des articles 5 et 6 de la directive communautaire, la cour juge que l’usage non autorisé, par un tiers, d’une dénomination sociale, d’un nom commercial ou d’une enseigne identique à une marque antérieure, dans le cadre d’une activité de commercialisation de produits identiques, constitue un usage que le titulaire de la marque est habilité à interdire en cas d’usage pour des produits portant atteinte aux fonctions de la marque, notamment sa fonction essentielle qui est de garantir aux consommateurs la provenance des produits ou des services (Dir. n° 89/104/CEE, 21 déc. 1988, art. 5). Si tel est le cas, cette même directive n’est susceptible de faire obstacle à une telle interdiction que si l’usage par le tiers de sa dénomination sociale ou de son nom commercial est fait conformément aux usages honnêtes en matière industrielle et commerciale (Dir. n° 89/104/CEE, 21 déc. 1988, art. 6). Ainsi, il appartiendra à la juridiction nationale de renvoi de vérifier si l’usage par Céline SARL, spécialisée dans le prêt-à-porter, du signe « Céline » porte atteinte ou est susceptible de porter atteinte aux fonctions de la marque Céline, et notamment à sa fonction essentielle. Il lui incombera également de déterminer si Céline SARL pratique une concurrence déloyale.

Source CJCE, 11 sept. 2007, aff. C-17/06, Céline SARL c/ Céline SA

Utilizarea de către un terț care nu a fost autorizat în acest scop a unei denumiri sociale, a unui nume comercial sau a unei embleme identice cu o marcă anterioară, în cadrul unei activități de comercializare a unor produse identice cu cele pentru care a fost înregistrată această marcă, constituie o utilizare pe care titularul mărcii respective este îndreptățit să o interzică în conformitate cu articolul 5 alineatul (1) litera (a) din Prima Directivă 89/104/CEE a Consiliului din 21 decembrie 1988 de apropiere a legislațiilor statelor membre cu privire la mărci, în cazul în care este vorba despre o utilizare pentru produse care aduce atingere sau este susceptibilă să aducă atingere funcțiilor mărcii.

În acest ultim caz, articolul 6 alineatul (1) litera (a) din Directiva 89/104 se poate opune unei astfel de interdicții numai dacă utilizarea denumirii sale sociale sau a numelui său comercial de către terț are loc conform practicilor loiale în domeniul industrial sau comercial.

Traducerea o gasiti aici.

Bibliografie:

Jean André, Affaire Céline: la Cour de Justice restreint la notion d’usage de marque, 12.09.2007 (*)

Vincenza M. D. Tarantino, Marchi registrati e diritti esclusivi, Giurisprudenza italiana, nov. 2007, p.2140-2141.

Tom Scourfield, A Tale of Two Celines, European Intellectual Property Review, 2008, p.71-74.

C.H. Gielen, Céline/Céline, Ars aequi, 2008, p.226-228.

A se vedea si Concluziile avocatului general Sharpston prezentate la data de 18 ianuarie 2007. (*)

Avion cu motor…Boeing si Airbus

The WTO Boeing-Airbus dispute: Update
 

Brussels, 26 September 2007

EU challenge to US subsidies to Boeing - first panel hearing

The focus in the EU-US aircraft dispute is now shifting to the EU’s challenge to US subsidies to Boeing (WTO case DS353) - the first panel hearing in this case will take place on 26-27 September 2007.The core of the EU’s challenge is the lavish R&D support provided by the US Department of Defense and NASA through various means, as well as Boeing-specific support provided at state and local level, such as subsidy packages tailor-made for Boeing in the states of Washington, Kansas and Illinois. The support clearly aims at weakening Airbus’ position and competitiveness and boosting that of Boeing. Although the US tries to dismiss the challenges using smoke and mirrors, US federal law makers, high-ranking officials, and local politicians have all acknowledged the vital role this support plays for Boeing. Former Washington State Governor Gary Locke has said that the Washington State support is designed to help “Boeing beat Airbus” and to “give Airbus executives many sleepless nights for years to come”. Former NASA Langley Director J.F. Creedon is on the record as saying that “the reason that there is a NASA Langley and the other aeronautics centers is to contribute technology to assure the pre-eminence of US aeronautics”.The EU challenge to US subsidies to Boeing - US reply and EU reactionThe US filed its reply to the EU’s challenge on 6 July 2007. The following points will be the focus of the hearing before the WTO panel hearing on 26-27 September 2007:

• The US readily acknowledges that FSC and successor schemes were prohibited export subsidies and that Boeing was a main beneficiary. The US, however, claims that Boeing will not avail itself of any benefits post-2006 despite an internal IRS memorandum which would allow for such benefits to be claimed by companies like Boeing. The US has failed provide any documentation that Boeing will actually forego these WTO-incompatible benefits.

• For subsidies granted by the State of Washington and the State of Illinois, the US puts up a less than vigorous defence and appears to agree with the EU that subsidies have benefited - and will continue to benefit - Boeing. In both states the subsidies are clearly designed for the exclusive benefit of Boeing. The US claims that these subsidies are generally available, or not designed for the benefit of Boeing lack any credibility. Indeed, these incentive packages have been designed in negotiations with the Boeing company, and even include a contractual promise by the State of Washington that it will provide a USD 4 billion subsidy regardless of form.

• For other subsidies, such as those granted by Kansas authorities, the US makes sweeping statements that Boeing has not benefited - and will not benefit. The US offers essentially no evidentiary support for these claims. The EU notes that these bonds are commonly referred to as “Boeing Bonds”: how can they not be for the benefit of Boeing?

• The US is contesting the amount of R&D subsidies granted to Boeing as challenged by the EU - an apparent contradiction with the US stance on its challenge of Airbus support where the US grossly inflates the numbers. The EC, in DS316 (the US challenge of support to Airbus), provided detailed tables and breakdowns of all Large Civil Aircraft (LCA)-related R&T support and offered to submit all original documentation regarding such support, should the Panel so request. One wonders why the US cannot be equally forthcoming.

• The US also seeks to argue that certain R&D support should be excluded for purposes of the WTO dispute as it has resulted in military or dual-use technologies which are subject to stringent US export controls and cannot be included in LCAs for exportation. The US conveniently overlooks the fact that while such technologies may not be part of an exported LCA as such, they may be - and frequently are - used in the actual production of LCAs. What is more, the press and even a former Boeing engineer have reported on suspicious Boeing practices of recreating research to “work around” ITAR controls and use military data for the Boeing 787 despite US restrictions. This is another example of how the US is hiding behind general statements about US laws and regulations while refusing to disclose the actual information and evidence related to R&D support to Boeing.

• For a breakdown of the total amount of subsidies offered by the US Government and US states to Boeing (USD 23.6 billion), see the attached table: “Overview of US subsidies to Boeing’s Large Civil Aircraft (LCA) division”.

Background information

• The EU WTO challenge to US subsidies to Boeing and the US WTO challenge to EU support for Airbus (DS316)

• Key dates in the WTO process in 2007-2008

• Details of the US subsidies to Boeing challenged by the EU

Sursa TradeIssues, European Commission.

Interplay between IP rights and competition law

The interplay between IP rights and competition law in the context of standardization

Piotr Staniszewski
Legal context: This article attempts to analyse the patent ambush scenario in the context of both competition law and IP rights under US and EC law. The regulators such as the US FTC and European Commission attempt to combat the abuses, however the legal tools available require a very difficult balancing act between patent law (which protects innovation) and competition law (which attempts to hamper abuse of the free market rules).

Key points: The patent ambush scenario employed within a standard-setting organization poses an important threat of jeopardizing the goals of achieving a common standard. The response to the problem concentrates on ensuring that the rules applicable to standard-setting organizations’ members prevent abuse and/or reaching reasonable and non-discriminatory licensing terms to stop deriving undue benefits from proprietary technologies embedded in the standard.

Practical significance: As the information exchange technologies become increasingly popular, the need to ensure interoperability between products of different manufacturers employing these technologies becomes crucial for market success. This consequently increases the danger of malignant abuse of co-operation within the standard setting-organizations. The law may need to step in to secure technological progress free of risks such as the patent ambush.

Piotr Staniszewski, The interplay between IP rights and competition law in the context of standardization, Journal of Intellectual Property Law & Practice Advance Access, 25 september 2007

Italia - ajutor acordat de stat Bisericii & ancheta Comisiei

In respectivul stat, Biserica Romano-Catolica beneficiaza de diverse facilitati (scutiri, reduceri de impozite etc. etc.)

Comisia Europeana urmeaza sa demareze o ancheta privind posibilitatea incalcarii de catre respectivul stat a regulilor in materia concurentei (1 & 2). De notat ca regimul national dateaza inca din anii 20, de pe urma unui concordat.

Reactia politicienilor italieni e f. interesanta (3).

Cauza T-351/03 (Schneider Electric) & recursul Comisiei

Deocamdata stirea bruta. Detalii mai tarziu.  Pourvoi de la Commission contre l’arrêt du TPICE dans l’affaire Schneider Electric

La Commission européenne a décidé de former un pourvoi devant la Cour de justice des Communautés européennes contre l’arrêt du Tribunal de première instance du 11 juillet 2007 (TPICE, aff. T-351/03 : JCP G 2007, act. 337) qui la condamne à indemniser l’entreprise Schneider Electric pour des dommages subis en raison de la violation de son droit à être entendu lors de l’examen de son projet d’acquisition de l’entreprise Legrand en 2001. Par cette décision, le Tribunal avait en effet estimé que la méconnaissance « grave et manifeste », par la Commission, des droits de la défense de Schneider constituait une violation suffisamment caractérisée du droit communautaire pour ouvrir un droit à indemnisation. Au soutien de son pourvoi, la Commission considère que les conditions d’engagement de la responsabilité non contractuelle de la Communauté ne sont pas remplies dans cette affaire. La Commission conteste d’abord que la violation des droits de la défense de Schneider Electric ait pu constituer la « violation suffisamment caractérisée » requise par la jurisprudence. En outre, elle estime qu’aucun lien de causalité ne peut être établi entre la faute prétendument commise et le principal chef de préjudice identifié par le Tribunal.

Source Comm. UE, 6 août 2007, n° IP/07/1213

Intelegere anticoncurentiala tacita

ICCJ a decis ca a fost aplicata gresit Legea nr. 21/1996, art. 5 alin. 1, intrucat instanta de fond s-a limitat sa constate ca reclamanta nu a incheiat nicio intelegere scrisa cu Asociatia armatorilor si operatorilor portuari.

Intelegerile anticoncurentiale se concretiza si in mod tacit, existenta lor rezultand din coroborarea unor fapte si acte care, impreuna, impun concluzia ca agentii economici au realizat practici anticoncurentiale, care au avut ca efect denaturarea concurentei pe piata serviciilor portuare.

 Aici puteti citi Decizia nr. 95/2005 a Consiliului Concurentei.

ICCJ, Sectia de contencios administrativ si fiscal, Decizia nr. 2244 din 26 aprilie 2007, RDC, nr. 9/2007, p. 91-94.

Nota: La p. 94 se afirma ca “a formulat recurs Consiliul Bucuresti”. Poate al Concurentei. Ne trebuie o dactilografa, ca si noi mai gresim, dar nu editam reviste.

Microsoft a pierdut

Rezultatul procesului la TPI a fost oarecum pevizibil. Comisia a aplicat corect sanctiunea amenzii.

Gasiti hotararea aici.

Un rezumat gasiti pe ECJBlog, si o prezentare cu trimitere la documentele aferente si declaratii pe EurActiv.com.

Bibliografia cazului:

Pierre Arhel, L’affaire Microsoft (À propos de la décision du TPICE du 17 septembre 2007), Petites Affiches, nr. 233/2007.
L’arrêt Microsoft du 17 septembre 2007 est sans doute l’un des plus importants rendus par le Tribunal de première instance en matière de concurrence. Sur le fond, il approuve entièrement la décision de la Commission ayant condamné l’entreprise pour deux comportements distincts à savoir le refus de fournir les informations relatives à l’interopérabilité du système d’exploitation Windows avec des produits concurrents et la vente liée du système d’exploitation Windows et de Windows Media Player. Il annule cependant la décision en ce qu’elle a ordonné la désignation d’un mandataire indépendant chargé d’évaluer et de vérifier la mise en oeuvre par Microsoft des mesures correctives ordonnées par la Commission.

Thomas O. Barnett, Interoperability Between Antitrust And Intellectual Property, George Mason Law Review, Volume 14, Number 4, Summer 2007

Ugo Patroni Griffi, Alfonso Papa Malatesta, L’interoperabilità del software: una essential facility? Implicazioni del “caso Microsoft”, Studi in onore di Gerhard Schricker, Giuffre Editore, 2005, p.469-507.

Olivia Dufour, Microsoft, une victoire éclatante pour la Commission européenne!, Petites Affiches, No 190, 21 septembre 2007.

Jean-Claude Zarka, Microsoft et la justice européenne, Gazette du Palais, nr. 127/2007.

Harry First, Strong Spine, Weak Underbelly: The CFI Microsoft Decision, New York University School of Law. New York University Law and Economics Working Papers, April 23, 2008, Paper 129.

On September 17, 2007, the European Court of First Instance decided Microsoft’s appeal of the European Commission’s 2004 decision finding that Microsoft had violated Article 82 of the EC Treaty by failing to provide certain interoperability information to Sun Microsystems and by refusing to dis-integrate Windows and the Windows Media Player. In this short comment I review the CFI’s decision, focusing on three ways in which the decision properly stiffens the strong spine of European competition law - its treatment of intellectual property, tying, and leveraging. The comment also discusses the EC’s remedy orders in Microsoft, which I argue reveal the soft underbelly of European competition law, a soft underbelly that the European Microsoft case shares with the U.S. Microsoft settlement.

Antitrust: Comisia suspecteaza o impartire a pietei intre E.ON si Gaz de France

La data de 30 iulie 2007 a fost deschisa o procedura formala impotriva societatilor E.On si Gaz de France, considerandu-se ca exista o suspiciune intemeiata in legatura cu impartirea pietelor, prin incalcarea art. 81 din Tratatul CE.

Cele doua societati implicate au fost anchetate in 2006, si, avand in vedere ca impart un gazoduct, exista suspiciuni ca ar exista acorduri sau practici concertate. Acestea nu au fost demonstrate ci doar prezumate.

Informarea publica se gaseste aici.

Antitrust Bulletin, nr. 1/2007 (Spring)

Dintre articolele acestui numar, remarcam:

Gregory T Gundlach, Aftermarkets, systems, and antitrust: a primer

Peter R Dickson, Evolutionary theories of competition and aftermarket antitrust law

Sumarul acestui articol (sumarul autorului):

Underlying the current debate about aftermarket competition is a fundamental zeitgeist issue, a disquiet about the intellectual foundations of antitrust law. From the perspective of modern evolutionary theories of competition, the problem is outdated rule of reason legal precedents buttressed by the application of a primitive theoretical paradigm. Deadweight intellectual capital, based on primitive economic principles, is indisputably ensconced in antitrust expertise and case law. In conclusion, when aftermarket innovations have the potential of adding greatly to the value of primary equipment, and other potentially strong (latent) feedback effects are likely to exist between supply and demand within the aftermarket and between supply and demand within the aftermarket and the primary market, it makes no sense to try to monopolize the secondary market. Neither does it make economic sense to give away the store, make no profits in the aftermarket, and only make profits in the primary market.

Revista poate fi citita in Proquest.

 Revista nu are pagina pe net, sau n-am gasit-o eu, dar poate fi folosit si sumarul realizat de Washington & Lee Law School.