Friedrich Wenzel Bulst, The Application of Art. 82 EC to Abusive Exclusionary Conduct, Rabels Zeitschrift, Vol. 73, No. 4, October 2009 [*]
The article addresses recent developments in the application of the prohibition of abuse of dominance in EC competition law. The European Commission has published a communication providing guidance on its enforcement priorities in applying Art. 82 EC to abusive exclusionary conduct of dominant undertakings. Under this more effects-based approach which focuses on ensuring consistency in the application of Arts. 81 and 82 EC as well as the Merger Regulation, priority will be given to cases where the conduct in question is liable to have harmful effects on consumers. After a brief introduction (section I), the author outlines the main elements of the communication and illustrates how the Commission’s approach to providing guidance in this area has evolved since the publication of its 2005 discussion paper on exclusionary abuses (section II). The author then addresses the scope of the communication against the background of the case law on the Commission’s discretion (not) to pursue cases (section III). The central concept of the communication is that of »foreclosure leading to consumer harm«. Against this background the author discusses, in the context of refusal to supply abuses both in and outside an IP context, the operationalisation of the criterion of harm to consumers (section IV) before concluding (section V).
CJCE a respins numeroasele motive de recurs ale societatilor bancare – “Clubul Lombard”.
Avizul Comitetului Economic și Social European privind propunerea de directivă a Parlamentului European și a Consiliului de modificare a Directivelor 77/91/CEE, 78/855/CEE și 82/891/CEE ale Consiliului și a Directivei 2005/56/CE privind obligațiile de raportare și întocmire a documentației necesare în cazul fuziunilor și divizărilor
2009/C 218/05, 11 septembrie 2009
[*]
CE: Raportul anual privind politica
in domeniul concurentei pe anul 2008
Raportul anual privind politica în domeniul concurenței conține pentru prima dată un capitol referitor la un subiect considerat a avea o importanță deosebită în acest domeniu. Subiectul ales pentru acest an este „Carteluri și consumatori”.
Proiect CSDE în Seria Consultări Europene: „Modificarea normelor de concurenţă aplicabile în sectorul distribuţiei”. DL: 25.08.2009
Comisia Europeană invită părţile interesate să formuleze observaţii privind propunerea sa de modificare a regulamentului de exceptare pe categorii şi a liniilor directoare referitoare la acordurile de furnizare şi distribuţie (restricţiile verticale). Actualul regulament va ieşi din vigoare în mai 2010. Având în vedere experienţa sa în aplicarea normelor menţionate şi observaţiile formulate de părţile interesate, Comisia consideră că, în general, aplicarea acestora dă rezultate bune şi că nu ar trebui modificate în mod fundamental. Principalele sugestii de modificare intenţionează să ia în considerare evoluţiile recente ale pieţei, în special creşterea puterii de cumpărare a marilor distribuitori cu amănuntul şi evoluţia vânzărilor on-line.
Regulamentul nr. 2790/1999 [text consolidat] al Comisiei de exceptare pe categorii permite ca acordurile de furnizare şi distribuţie care sunt conforme cu prevederile sale să beneficieze de o derogare de la interdicţia prevăzută de Tratatul CE privind practicile comerciale restrictive [articolul 81 alineatul 1]. Actualul regulament de exceptare pe categorii va ieşi din vigoare în mai 2010. Evaluarea preliminară a Comisiei privind aplicarea acestuia, în baza experienţei şi a observaţiilor formulate de părţile interesate, a constatat că aplicarea normelor actuale a dat rezultate bune în practică.
Două evoluţii importante au marcat deceniul care a urmat intrării în vigoare a normelor actuale: o creştere suplimentară a puterii de piaţă a marilor distribuitori şi vânzările efectuate pe internet.
Comisia este interesată, în special, de observaţiile referitoare la aplicarea generală a actualelor norme, la măsura în care evoluţiile recente ale pieţei ar trebui să influenţeze prevederile regulamentului şi abordarea sugerată de Comisie privind puterea de piaţă a cumpărătorului, precum şi de observaţiile referitoare la restricţiile privind vânzările on-line.
Centrul de Studii de Drept European al Institutului de Cercetări Juridice al Academiei Romane organizeaza o selectie de CV-uri pentru realizarea unui punct de vedere documentat in acest sens. Vor fi selectati experti care vor realiza cercetarea si punctul de vedere, concretizate intr-un material care ulterior va dat publicat.
Denumirea proiectului: „Modificarea normelor de concurenţă aplicabile în sectorul distribuţiei”. (CSDE-SCE-2)
Persoanele interesate vor trimite un CV, in format european, se pot trimite la adresa contact@csde.ro pana la data de 25 august 2009. Numai candidaţii selectaţi vor fi contactaţi.
Sunt de asemenea invitaţi să-şi trimită CV-ul şi cei care ar fi interesaţi să participe la elaborarea unor studii viitoare, cu precizarea domeniilor de interes. Aceste candidaturi vor servi la actualizarea bazei de date a CSDE.
Cercetarea trebuie sa fie definitivata, iar punctul de vedere redactat pana la data de 20 septembrie 2009.
Proiectul este sustinut de catre Wolters Kluwer.
Documente:
Proiect de Comunicare a Comisiei. Linii directoare privind restrctiile verticale
Partener media: juridice.ro
UN rapsuns la problema experientelor UE din domeniul concurentei puteti gasi in Comunicarea Comisiei catre Parlament si Consiliu [COM (2009), 206 final] documentul de lucru aici.
Desigur este o obligatie de serviciu, pentru ca art. 44 din Regulamentul 1/2003 prevedea obligatia ca pana la 1 mai 2009, sa fie publicat un astfel de raport.
Barry E. Hawk, Article 82 and Section 2: Abuse and Monopolizing Conduct, Issues of Competition Law and Policy, Vol. 2, p. 871, 2008; Fordham Law Legal Studies Research Paper No. 1301690. Available at SSRN
Abstract:
Differing historical contexts, such as the greater role of public companies and state-created monopolies in the EU, differing policy considerations such as the EU’s traditional embrace of fairness, and differing underlying economic and juridical assumptions about, among others, market erosion and the capability of authorities and courts to identify and remedy anticompetitive conduct, all explain the traditionally broader scope of Article 82 compared with Section 2. However, the EU’s increasing acceptance of mainstream economics, welfare analysis and an effects-oriented inquiry, together with the declining influence of the Ordoliberals, should narrow (but not eliminate) the present gap between Section 2 and Article 82.
Daca unii se intreaba despre (im)posibilitatea existentei unei insolvente internationale, altii discuta despre hotararile judecatoresti.
O problema care, la scara mica ramane si in Uniunea Europeana, cu tot Regulamentul nr. 1346/2000, nu a raspuns cerinţelor. Încă, şi pentru mult timp. Sau până când vaveni CJCE cu niste hotărâri interesante. Ceva lumina s-a făcut şi în Laval, deşi nu era decât un bec într-o cămăruţă. A servictorilor. Să vedeţi întreg Palatul conştiinţei europene în lumină!
In orice caz, articolul e interesant.
Michal S. Gal, Free Movement of Judgments: Increasing Deterrence of International Cartels Though Jurisdictional Reliance, (October 29, 2008). NYU Law and Economics Research Paper No. 08-44. Available at SSRN.
Abstract:
This article challenges the conventional wisdom that not much can be done under the existing atomistic system of antitrust enforcement to solve the problem of sub-optimal deterrence of international cartels. Low deterrence results from the fact that international cartels are generally prosecuted by only a fraction of the jurisdictions harmed by them and that monetary sanctions in those jurisdictions are generally based on harm to their domestic markets only. To solve this problem, this article proposes a novel legal tool which enables countries to adopt and rely upon foreign findings of international hard-core cartels, provided that the foreign decisions meet criteria that ensure that such reliance is reasonable and fair. As elaborated, this free movement of judgments holds potential to overcome the main obstacles to efficient deterrence and to significantly increase both domestic as well as global welfare. Its costs can also be largely overcome by designing appropriate solutions. The political implications are also not prohibitive. As shown, jurisdictions already rely on foreign judgments that do not significantly differ from the decisions at hand.
Bruce Abramson, ARE “ONLINE MARKETS” REAL AND RELEVANT? FROM THE MONSTER-HOTJOBS MERGER TO THE GOOGLE-DOUBLECLICK MERGER, Journal of Competition Law and Economics Advance Access published online on September 26, 2008 [*]
This article examines two Internet merger investigations from 2001 and 2007 to answer the question of whether there is such a thing as a distinct “Internet market,” and if so, how an antitrust analysis of such a market should differ from parallel analyses applied to more conventional markets. A quick comparison of two Internet advertising mergers from different stages of the Internet’s existence demonstrates two things. First, as the novelty of the Internet wears off, online merger analysis looks increasingly like offline merger analysis. Second, most of the things that make online mergers interesting have little to do with competition law.
Concentrations: la Commission autorise le projet de rachat de Volkswagen par Porsche, Bruxelles, le 23 juillet 2008, IP/08/1201 [EN, FR]
La Commission européenne a autorisé, en vertu du règlement CE sur les concentrations, le projet de rachat de Volkswagen Allemagne par la société allemande Porsche. Après avoir examiné l’opération, elle a conclu que l’opération n’entraverait pas de manière significative l’exercice d’une concurrence effective dans l’Espace économique européen (EEE) ou une partie substantielle de celui-ci.
Articolul este fara indoiala interesant.
Dino Falaschetti, CAN LOBBYING PREVENT ANTICOMPETITIVE OUTCOMES? EVIDENCE ON CONSUMER MONOPSONY IN TELECOMMUNICATIONS, Journal of Competition Law and Economics Advance Access published online on June 4, 2008 [*]
When basic competition rules cannot stop market power abuses, industry-specific regulations can improve economic performance. But regulations are also more immediately exposed to political pressures than are judicially administered antitrust laws, and this exposure can cause regulations to serve distributional rather than efficiency goals. Instead of supporting a Chicago School hypothesis where distributional forces tend to favor producers, however, I find evidence that regulations can inefficiently expand consumer surplus when producers lack a political voice. In particular, local exchange carriers maintain significantly smaller capital stocks in states that restrict campaign contributions from regulated utilities. This relationship is difficult to rationalize as either a statistical artifact or evidence that campaign finance laws discourage producers from restraining trade. Indeed, rather than endowing producers with political currency to capture regulators, allowances for campaign contributions appear to have strengthened competition by discouraging regulatory takings and balancing monopsonistic pressures from consumer-voters. These results highlight an empirically important potential for regulations to favor consumers overly, and strengthen arguments against consumer surplus as an objective for competition policies.
Gerlinger v. Amazon.com Inc., No. 05-17328, U.S. 9th Circuit, May 27, 2008
In an antitrust action challenging a marketing agreement between the booksellers Amazon.com and Borders, dismissal of the action is affirmed where plaintiff lacked standing because he did not show that he ever purchased an item for a higher price than he would have paid had there been no marketing agreement, and thus he had suffered no injury-in-fact. [*]
Aceasta editie supliment, pe langa editia inaugurala a seriei, adauga si aduce la zi legislatia din mai mlte state dar si cea din Uniunea Europeana.
Editia inaugurala: Maher Dabbah, Paul Lasok (General editor), Merger Control Worldwide 3 Volume Set, Cambridge University Press, 2008 [*] Capitolul referitor la Romania ii apartine lui Gelu Goran.
Editia supliment: Maher Dabbah, Paul Lasok (General editor), Merger Control Worldwide. Second Supplement to the First Edition, Cambridge University Press, 2008 [*] De la p. 41 la 45 cartea se refera si la Uniunea Europeana. O sinteza e o sinteza.
Jürgen Basedow, The Modernization of European Competition Law: A Story of Unfinished Concept, Texas International Law Journal. Austin: Summer 2007. Vol. 42, Iss. 3. [*]
Summary
I. Decentralization
II. A More Economic Approach in Merger Control
III. Private Enforcement
Nicholas Economides and William N. Hebert, “Patents and Antitrust: Application to Adjacent Markets” (August 1, 2007)
We examine the intersection of patents and antitrust where a patent holder uses the monopoly power it possesses in the market for a patented product to exclude competitors in an adjacent market and attempt to monopolize or monopolize the adjacent market. The present scheme for awarding patents cannot judge when the issuance of a patent will lead to the appropriate balance between innovation and efficiency. Where a patent holder’s invention uses an interface with adjacent products, the patent holder may be tempted to extend its patent monopoly into adjacent markets that depend upon the interface with the patented invention. Economic theory suggests that it is inappropriate to immunize a patent holder from antitrust liability when it attempts to extend its patent monopoly into adjacent markets, because it could decrease consumer surplus. Courts have expressed their reluctance to scrutinize a patent holder’s innovations and design changes, because of the potential benefits of the innovations and their reluctance to second-guess the marketplace. However, applying traditional antitrust principles, courts have found that monopolists could be liable for unlawfully extending their monopoly positions into adjacent markets in the areas of computer peripherals and software applications; aftermarkets for replacement parts, service and maintenance of durable goods; design changes to medical devices; and changes in drug formulas. While the patent laws provide a spur to innovation by granting limited monopoly rights, the antitrust laws curb the excessive reach of these monopoly rights by acting as a check on excessive expansion of the scope of the patent grant.
Download the paper (*).
Comunicare jurisdicţională consolidată a Comisiei în temeiul Regulamentului (CE) nr. 139/2004 al Consiliului privind controlul concentrărilor economice între întreprinderi [*]
Over the past two to three decades economics has played an increasingly important role in the development of U.S. antitrust enforcement and policy. This essay first reviews the major facets of U.S. antitrust enforcement and next reviews the ways in which economics — starting from a low base — has grown in importance in antitrust. The essay then highlights three antitrust areas in which the influence of economics has had the greatest influence: merger analysis, vertical relationships, and predatory pricing. The essay concludes with the identification of four antitrust areas where further economics analysis could have high returns.
The Elusive Antitrust Standard on Bundling in Europe and in the United States at the Aftermath of the Microsoft Cases (*)
Abstract:
We analyze and contrast the US and EU antitrust standards on mixed bundling and tying. We apply our analysis to the US and EU cases against Microsoft on the issue of tying new products (Internet Explorer in the US, and Windows Media Player in the EU) with Windows as well as to cases brought in Europe and in the United States on bundling discounts. We conclude that there are differences between the EC and US antitrust law on the choice of the relevant analogy for bundled rebates (predatory price standard or foreclosure standard) and the implementation of the distinct product and coercion test for tying practices. The second important difference between the two jurisdictions concerns the interpretation of the requirement of anticompetitive foreclosure. It seems to us that in Europe, consumer detriment is found easily and it is not always a requirement for the application of Article 82, or at least that the standard of proof of a consumer detriment for tying cases is lower than in the US.
La data de 30 iulie 2007 a fost deschisa o procedura formala impotriva societatilor E.On si Gaz de France, considerandu-se ca exista o suspiciune intemeiata in legatura cu impartirea pietelor, prin incalcarea art. 81 din Tratatul CE.
Cele doua societati implicate au fost anchetate in 2006, si, avand in vedere ca impart un gazoduct, exista suspiciuni ca ar exista acorduri sau practici concertate. Acestea nu au fost demonstrate ci doar prezumate.
Informarea publica se gaseste aici.
